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Abstract 
Cryptography has a much wider application than secrecy, such as 
authentication and digital signature. There are two common types of 
cryptographic algoritlims - symmetric and asymmetric. The Data Encryption 
Standaid (DES) is the first and only, publicly available cryptographic 
algoritlim tliat has been widely used in commercial conmiunication. The DES 
is a block cipher symmetric algoritlim and its design is based on the 
Shannon's two general principles - diffusion and confusion. With the 
decreased cost of hardware and a better understanding of block ciphers and 
cryptanalysis techniques, a number of DES-like ciphers have been proposed 
as the replacement for DES. One-way hashing functions are useful in 
implementing any digital signature schemes. A hashing function accepts a 
vai'iable size message M as input and outputs a fixed size representation of 
tlie message H(M). A number of hashing functions of fixed size or variable 
size message digest have been proposed. The cryptographic primitives (des, 
feal, loki, kliufu, and kliafre), block cipher based hashing algorithms (sbh 
and dbh), and key-less hashing algorithms (md4, md4x, md5 and haval) have 
been implemented as standard commands and C library calls for the UNIX 
Operating System. 
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1. Introduction 
The first indications of cryptography go back almost as far as the origin of writing 
[Kah67]. Secure transmission of private information is a basic requirement between a 
sender and a receiver. The problem in cryptography is devising procedures to transform 
message (plaintext) into ciyptograms (cipheitext) that can withstand intense cryptanalysis. 
Today, cryptography can be used to hide the meaning of information in any form, such as 
data stored on a disk or messages in transit through a communication network. 
Cryptography has a much wider application than secrecy, such as authentication and digital 
signature. 
There are two types of cryptographic algorithms - symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. 
In the paradigm of the symmetric cryptography or single key cryptography (Figure 1.1), 
there is only a single piece of private and necessarily secret information - the key - known 
to and used by the sender and also known and used by intended receiver to decrypt the 
cipher. With the asymmetric cryptography or public key cryptography (Figure 1.2) -
[Seb89], there are two keys, one publicly known to and used by the sender, and the other 
secret key known and used by the receiver to decrypt the cipher. 
r Opponent ^ 
Figure 1.1 A schematic for a symmetric cryptosystem 
It is possible to design unbreakable ciphers. This concept is based on the Shannon theory 
of perfect security [Sha49]. A necessary and sufficient condition for perfect secrecy is that 
for every ciphertext C, PM(C) = P(C), that is, the probability of receiving ciphertext C is 
independent of enciypting it with plaintext M. To do so, the key must be randomly selected 
- the key must have the same chance of being chosen - and used only once. Furthermore, 
the length of the key must be equal to or greater than the length of the plaintext to be 
enciphered. This type of cipher is known as one-time pad cipher, is impractical for most 
applications, because of the key length is as long as the length of the message. 
There are two ways to design a strong cryptographic algorithm. First, the algorithm is 
designed based on the possible methods of solution available to the cryptanalyst. Second, 
the algorithm is constructed in such a way that breaking it requires the solution of some 
known problem, one that is difficult to solve, or computationally infeasible. The Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [NBS77] was designed using the first approach. While the 
public key RSA scheme was designed using the second approach. 
Figure 1.2 A schematic for an asymmetric cryptosystem 
The rest of this report is divided into two main parts. The first part is used to introduce 
symmetric block ciphers, the modes of operation and their cryptographic primitives - DES, 
FEAL-NX, Loki, Khufu, and Khafre. The second part is used to introduce one-way hash 
functions, their applications and schemes of implementing key hashed functions based on 
symmetric block ciphers and keyless hash functions. The UNIX implementations of 
cryptographic primitives and one-way hash functions are described in the appendix. 
2. Symmetric Block Ciphers 
Cryptographic systems are also classified into block and stream ciphers. The classification 
is based on the size of the objects to which the cryptographic transformation is applied 
[Sim92]. If the objects are single symbols (normally an alphabetic or numeric character) the 
system is called a stream cipher, while if the object is made up of several symbols, the 
system is said to be a block cipher. In the second case, blocks could be considered to be 
symbols from a larger symbol alphabet, however the distinction between stream and block 
ciphers is a useful device when considering such problems as error propagation, 
synchronisation, and especially of the achievable communication data rates and delays. 
By block cipher, a symmetric key cryptosystem transforms message (plaintext) blocks of 
fixed length (k bits) into ciphertext blocks of the same length, under the control of a key k 
(m bits). Thus, if M is an n-bit message block then C = E]^(M) is the corresponding n-bit 
ciphertext block when key k is used. In addition, we have M = D]^(C) = D]^(E]^(M)). 
The search for a secure cryptographic systems has often resulted with a mix of success and 
failure, and the subsequent development of more secure cryptosystems. One of such events 
is the best known and widely used symmetric algorithm - the Data Encryption Standard. 
The DES [NBS77] is the first, and only, publicly available cryptographic algorithm that 
has been endorsed by the US Government. Although there has been some controversy 
about its key size, DES has successfully resisted all cryptanalysis attacks and been widely 
accepted in commercial communication. The DES is a symmetric block cipher algorithm 
which transforms a 64-bit input data to a 64-bit output cipher. 
Although the use of DES was reaffirmed only until 1992, the algorithm serves as the best 
example of using the Shannon's two general principles [Sha49] - diffusion and confusion. 
The diffusion is to spread out of the influence of a single plaintext digit over many 
ciphertext digits so as to hide the statistical structure of the plaintext. An extension of this 
idea is to spread the influence of a single key digit over many digits of ciphertext so as to 
frustrate a piecemeal attack on the key. The confusion is to use enciphering transformations 
that complicate the detemination of how the statistics of the ciphertext depending on the 
statistics of the plaintext. 
The common approach to apply the Shannon's principles is the product cipher, that is, a 
cipher that can be implemented as succession of simple ciphers, each of which adds its 
modest share to the overall large amount of diffusion and confusion. The approach is to 
use a sequence of transformations - substitutions and transpositions. That is, iterated 
cryptosystems are a family of cryptographically strong functions based on iterating a 
weaker function n times. 
The DBS is the product ciphers in terms of employing 16 rounds of successive 
encipherment, each round consisting of rather simple transpositions and substitutions of 4-
bit groups. Only 48 key bits are used to control each round, but these are selected in a 
random-appearing way for successive rounds from the full 56-bit key. That is, the round 
function is a function of the output of the previous round and of a subkey which a key-
dependent value calculated via a key scheduling algorithm. 
The round function is usually based on S-boxes, bit permutations, arithmetic operations 
and the addition modulo 2 operations. The S-boxes are nonlinear translation tables 
mapping a small number of input bits to a small number of output bits. The security of the 
cryptosystem crucially depends on their choice [Bih91a]. The bit permutation is used to 
rearrange the output bits of the S-boxes in order to make the input bits of each S box in the 
following round depend on the output of as many S-boxes as possible. 
The basic design principles in DES seem sound [Mer90], due to the fact that DES has not 
been publicly broken. But from the day of designing DES until now, there are several 
changing factors, such as the decreased cost of hardware, a better understanding of the 
cryptanalysis techniques. Several DES-like block ciphers have been designed as a 
replacement for DES. The Fast Encryption Algorithm (FEAL-NX), by A.Shimizu and 
S.Miyaguchi [Shi87], [Miy90], suitable for software and hardware implementation. The 
LOKI encryption algorithm, by L.Brown, J.Pieprzyk, and J.Seberry [Bro90], [Bro91], 
the Loki detailed structure has been designed to remove operations which impede analysis 
or hinder efficient implementation which do not add to the cryptographic security of the 
algorithm. The KHUFU and KHAFRE encryption algorithm, by R.Merkle [Mer90], 
Khufu is designed for fast bulk encryption of large amounts of data by using precomputed 
tables, and Khafre is designed to encrypt small amounts of data. The alternative algorithms 
are claimed to have the equal security level with DES, but they remain to be tested. 
3. Applications of DES-like Ciphers 
The symmetric block cipher algorithms are the basic building block for data protection. 
That is, the algorithms provide the user with a set of primitive functions each of which 
transforms a 64-bit input to a 64-bit output under the control of 64-bit key. In the DBS for 
example, the user selects one of transformation functions which is equivalent to lOi"̂  
to be used by a particular 56-bit key (64-bit DBS key with 8 parity bits). All DBS-like 
algorithms can be used for data encryption, data authentication, or both data encryption and 
data authentication. The security of the application is based on the security of the selected 
cryptographic primitive. 
3.1. Data encryption 
To make DBS-like ciphers more useful than just encrypting or decrypting 64-bit block of 
data, we need to expand the capability of algorithm by using a suitable mode when encrypt 
data having greater than 64 bits. 
The DBS algorithm can be used in four modes [NBS80]: electronic code book (ECB), 
cipher block chaining mode (CBC), cipher feedback (CFB), and output feedback (OFB) 
[Gar91]. These four modes are used to implement UNDC commands of the block cipher 
algorithms - des, feal, loki, khufu, and khafre - to provide four operational modes to 
encrypt and decrypt 64-bit blocks. The cipher block chaining (cbc) mode is the default and 
the recommended mode when enciypting messages or files. 
The following is a general description of these four modes: 
3.1.1. ECB mode. In electronic code book (Figure 3.1), each block of the input is 
encrypted using the key, and the output is written as a block. This method is simple 
encryption of a message, a block at a time. If the same block of 64 bits occurs twice, the 
cipher block will also be repeated. With random data this would not matter because of its 
rarity, but redundancy in real messages makes it vulnerable to statistical attack. This 
method may not indicate when portions of a message have been inserted or removed. It 
works well with noisy channels - alteration of a few bits will corrupt only a single 64-bit 
block. 
Figure 3.1 Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode 
ECB should be used only where the data being encrypted are truly random or have a large 
random component. Usually these are keys which are being encrypted under another key 
for storage or transmission through the network. 
3.1.2. CBC mode. A message can be divided into blocks of 64 bits and the sequence 
encrypted with safety if a special feedback arrangement is used. In cipher block chaining 
mode (Figure 3 . 2 ) , the plaintext is first XOR'ed with the encrypted value of the previous 
block. Some known value - initial vector - is used for the first block. The result is then 
encrypted using the key. Because bits in the message propagate through the entire cipher, 
the last block can be used as a checksum/signature to check that the ciphertext has not been 
altered (also see section 6.1). Furthermore, long runs of repeated characters in the 
plaintext will be masked in the output. CBC mode is the default mode in the des, feal, loki, 
khufu, and khafre programs. If there is a single error occurred in the ciphertext it will 
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Figure 3.2 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode 
3.1 .3 . C F B m o d e . In cipher feedback mode (Figure 3.3), the key is initially set to some 
value, and after each block encryption, a portion of the output is shifted into the key. The 
new key is then used to encrypt the next block of text, and so on. This method is self-
synchronising, and enables the user to decipher just a portion of a large database by 
starting a fixed distance before the start of the desired data. If there is a single error 
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Figure 3.3 K-bit Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode 
3.1.4. OFB mode. In output feedback mode (Figure 3.4), the basic algorithm is used to 
generate a pseudorandom sequence. That is, the key field is encrypted using the ECB mode 
of des, feal, loki, khufu, or khafre. The result is then used as the key to encrypt the data 
block, and that output is also used as the new key. Meanwhile, this same output is used as 
a form of one-time pad to XOR with the plaintext. If there is a single error occurred in the 
ciphertext it will only affect the coiTesponding plaintext bit. Also, this mode of encryption 
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Figure 3.4 K-bit Output Feedback (OFB) mode 
3.2. Data Authentication 
DES-like ciphers can be used to produce a cryptographic checksum that can be used to 
protect against both accidental and intentional, but unauthorised data modification. 
Essentially the data is enciypted by using CBC, CFB, or OFB mode to obtain the final 64-
bit cipher block which represent a complex function for the whole data file, or data string. 
The property of this method is that it is the authentication method in which the user can 
input the key. And any single bit modification will be propagated to the final cipher block. 
Section 6 gives a more details of algorithms and actual implementation of this 
authentication method. 
3.3. Data Encryption and Authentication 
The same data can be protected by both enciyption and authentication. The data is protected 
from disclosure by encryption and modification is detected by authentication. The 
authentication process can be applied to either plaintext or ciphertext. 
4. Cryptographic Primitives for Block Ciphers 
The following section is the general description of symmetric block cipher primitives - the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES), the Fast Encryption Algorithm family (FEAL), the LOKI 
encryption algorithm, the Khufu encryption algorithm (KHUFU) and the Khafre 
encryption algorithm (KHAFRE). The primitives are the basic building blocks for 
encryption and decryption. The algorithms share the same property that 64-bit plaintext is 
encrypted to produce 64-bit ciphertext under the control of 64-bit key. There are a few 
differences among them, such as the extended version of FEAL (FEAL-NX) uses 128-bit 
key, a different number of rounds, and Khufu uses precomputed S-boxes. 
4.1. Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
The Data Encryption Standard design was based on Lucifer. Its proper name is DEA (Data 
Encryption Algorithm) in the US and DEAl (Data Encryption Algorithm 1) in other 
countries. It is used to encrypt and decrypt blocks of data consisting of 64 bits under 
control of a 64-bit key. Decryption is done by using the same key as for encryption, but 
with the schedule of addressing the key bits altered so that the decrypting process is the 
reverse of the encrypting process. 
A block to be encrypted is subject to an initial permutation IP, then to a 16-round complex 
key-dependent computation and finally to a permutation which is the inverse of the initial 
permutation IP-^. The key-dependent computation can be simply defined in terms of a 
function f, called the cipher function, and a function KS, called the key schedule. 
Each round of the algorithm is four separate operations. First, a right half is expanded from 
32 bits to 48 bits. Then it is combined with a form of the key. The result of this operation 
is then substituted for another result and condensed to 32 bits. The sketch of each round 
calculation is in Figure 4.1. 
Let Ti denote the result of the î ^ iteration and let Lj and R̂  denote the left and right halves 
of Ti respectively; that is, Tj = L̂  Rj, where 
Li = ti t32, 
Ri = t33 t64, then 
Li = Ri-i 
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Figure 4.1 Detail of one round calculation 
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Figure 4. 3 DES Encipherment Computation 
Where Kj is a 48-bit key. After the last iteration, the left and the right halves are not 
interchanged; instead the concatenated block RigLia is input to the final permutation IP-i. 
Decipherment is perfonned by using the same algorithm, except that K^^ is used in the first 
iteration, K15 in the second, and so on. The order of the key is reversed, the algorithm is 
itself not. 
Figure 4.3 shows a sketch of tlie DES encipherment calculation 
Figure 4.4 shows a sketch of the function f(Ri.i,Ki). First Ri.i is expanded to a 48-bit 
block E(Ri.i) using the bit-selection table E. Next, the exclusive-or of E(Ri.i) and Ki is 
calculated and the result broken into eight 6-bit blocks B^, ,B8- Each 6-bit block is then 
used as an input to a selection function S box which returns a 4-bit block. The resulting 32-
bit block is transposed by the permutation P. 
A sketch of the calculation of cipher function f(R,K) is as follows: 
R ( 32 bits) 
® 
48 bits K ( 48 bits) 
s O ( s = >4) ( s 15) C s ¡7 ) ( S8 
32 bits 
Figure 4.4 Calculation of f(R,K) 
The S-boxes introduce nonlinearity into the DES. There are eight S-boxes in the DES, each 
of which is a set of four permutations on sixteen elements. S-boxes were not chosen at 
random, but there is no known cryptographic weakness resulting from these properties 
[Pfl89]. The full list of S-box design properties have never been released (they are 
classified by the US), although a number of research papers have discussed possible 
properties interpolated from the published design, for example [Web85], [Bro89]. Some 
S-box properties can be partially described as follows: 
- No S-box is a linear function of its input; that is, the four output bits cannot be 
expressed as a system of linear equations of the six input bits; 
- Changing one bit in the input of an S-box results in changing at least two output bits; 
that is, the S-boxes diffuse their information well throughout their outputs; 
- The S-boxes were chosen to minimize the difference between the number of Is and Os 
when any single input bit is held constant; that is, holding a single bit constant as 0 or 1 
and changing the bits around it should not lead to disproportionately many Os or Is in 
the output. 
Figure 4.5 shows a sketch of key schedule calculation. Each iteration i uses a different 48-
bit key Ki derived from the initial key K. 
There are a set of DBS keys - weak keys, semi-weak keys, and others reducing the 
cryptographic strength of the algorithm. They are should be avoided, although they 
represent a very small percentage of the total key numbers (256). 
For a detailed description, all specific table values and weak keys of DBS algorithm, the 
reader is referred to [NBS77], [Seb89], [Pfl89]. The past and future of DBS are discussed 
in [Sim92]. 
A C program des is implemented by using the DBS specification of the US National 
Bureau of Standards [NBS77]. The full source listing of the program is presented in the 
appendix section. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program des which is run to encrypt 100Kb block 
under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation for 8, 16, 24, 32 
rounds and four modes in table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.5 Key Schedule Calculation 
Table 4.1 DES program performance 
HP 
mode ECB CBC CFB OFB ECB CBC CFB OFB 
round 
8 8.7 8.7 69.6 69.6 14.3 14.6 117.1 116.2 
16 16.0 16.1 128.5 128.2 27.2 27.3 216.7 218.1 
24 23.3 23.3 186.7 186.7 38.5 38.7 316.0 318.6 
32 31.2 31.1 233.5 233.6 52.6 52.9 421.4 422.1 
The results show that for the same number of rounds, ECB and CBC modes take less time 
to process than the CFB and OFM modes. Due to the fact that with ecb and cbc modes, des 
encrypts 64 bits at a time while with cfb and ofb, des encrypts only k bits (less than 64 
bits). 
The running speed of program des is relatively slower than other symmetric cipher 
algorithms. This is due to that the program DES uses extensive table lookup. The extensive 
use of peimutation in DES to spread infonnation (diffusion) is expensive in software 
implementation.This is not to fault DES, it is one of the design objectives in DES for 
hardware implementation. 
Each individual S-box in DES provides only 64 entries of 4 bits each, or 32 bytes per S-
box. DES uses 8 S-boxes and looks up 8 different values in them simultaneously. While 
this is appropriate for hardware, it seems an unreasonable restriction to software with 
sequential program execution. 
L.Brown, Australian Defense Force Academy, suggests that there are ways to improve the 
executing speed of DES. The techniques can be used include the use of pre-computed 
tables for many of the functions, incorporation of permutation P in DES into the S-box 
lookup tables, use of macro's and lookup tables in large peimutations such as IP in DES, 
better functional decomposition, careful selection of internal data structures, and 
unravelling all inner loops. Some of these techniques are applied for the revised version of 
DES program, the results indicate that the speed can be improved a factor of cCt ieuit 
~two. 
4.2. The FEAL Cryptographic Primitive Family 
PEAL is 64-bit symmetric block cipher algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to produce a 
64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64-bit key. But in contrast to DES, a software 
implementation does not require a table look-up. The processing speed is expected to be 
faster than DES. 
Feal consists of two processing parts. One is the key schedule which generates the 256-bit 
extended key from the 64-bit secret key for 8-round FEAL (FEAL-8). It is designed to 
generate different extended keys for different secret keys. The other is the data randomizer 
which generates 64-bit cipheitext from 64-bit plain text under control of the extended key. 
One program can perfonn two functions, encipherment and decipherment, except for the 
extended key enu-y. 
FEAL working with no parity in a key block is safe from all-key attack because it is 
controlled by a 64-bit key, which is longer than the 56-bit DES key. 
FEAL-4 and FEAL-8 have been expanded to FEAL-N (N round FEAL with 64-bit key), 
where FEAL-N with N is even and N = is recommended). FEAL-N has also been 
expanded to FEAL-NX (X: key expansion, N round FEAL with 128-bit key) that accepts 
128-bit keys. When the right half of the 128-bit key is all zeros, FEAL-NX works as 
FEAL-N. 
A sketch of FEAL-NX data randomization is in figure 4.6 and calculation of extended key 
is in figure 4.7. 
One of the building blocks of the FEAL cipher is a transformation S. 
The S function in the f function is defined as: 
S(x,y,delta) = R0T2(T); 
T = x+y+delta mod 256 
where x,y: one-byte data; delta: constant (0 or 1); 
R0T2(T): 2-bit left rotation operation on T. 
For a detailed description of the algorithm, the reader is referred to [Shi87] and [Miy90]. 
Plaintext {Ciphertext} block 
Ciphertext {P" 
Figure 4.6 Feal Data Randomization 
Key block (KL, KR ) : 128bits 
Figure 4.7 Key Schedule of FEAL (FEAL-NX) 
Figure 4.8 FEAL Function f 
fkCa.b) 
Figure 4.9 FEAL Function Fj. 
A C program feal is implemented by using algorithm proposed in [Shi87] and the 
extensions to the original design in [Miy90]. The full source listing of the program is 
presented in the appendix section. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program feal, which is run to encrypt 100Kb block 
under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation for 8, 16, 24, 32 
rounds and four modes in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Program feal performance 
Fujitsu HP 
mode ECB CBC CFB OFB ECB CBC CFB OFB 
round 
8 0.3 0.3 2.3 2.3 0.6 0.7 5.4 5.5 
16 0.5 0.5 4.3 4.3 1.2 1.2 10.3 9.9 
24 0.8 0.8 6.4 6.4 1.7 1.6 14.4 15.1 
32 1.0 1.0 8.4 8.4 2.5 2.5 20.0 19.1 
The results show that for the same number of rounds, ECB and CBC modes take less time 
to process than the CFB and OFM modes. And it runs faster than des by a factor of 30. 
4.3. The LOKI Cryptographic Primitive 
LOKI is another 64-bit encryption and decryption algorithm proposed by L.Brown, 
M.Kwan, J.Pieprzyk, and J.Seberry [Bro90], [Bro91]. The algorithm is designed to 
encrypt or decrypt blocks of data under the control of 64-bit key. 
A block to be encrypted is added modulo 2 to the key, is then processed in 16 rounds of a 
complex key-dependent computation, and finally is added modulo 2 to the key again. The 
key-dependent computation can be defined in terms of a confusion-diffusion function f, 
and a key schedule KS. The same key is used for both encryption and decryption, but with 
the schedule of addressing the key bits altered so that the decryption process is the reverse 
of the encryption process. 
The Loki uses one twelve-bit to eight-bit S box based on irreducible polynomials four 
times each rounds. The sketch of S-box calculation is in Figure 4.10. 
Figure 4.10 Loki S-box detail 
The same structure with alternate substitution functions may be used to build private 
variants of the original algorithm. 
The original version of LOKI is now designated LOKI89, the revised version has the 
following modifications: 
- Change key schedule to interchange halves after every second round, 
- Change key rotations to alternate between R0T13 and R0T12, 
- Remove initial and final XORs of key with plaintext and ciphertext, 
- Alter the S-box function. 
The general description of the revised algorithm can be described as follows. 
Encryption: The 64-bit input block X is partitioned into two 32-bit blocks L and R. 
Similarly, the 64 key is partitioned into two 32-bit blocks KL and LR. 
The key-dependent computation consists of 16 rounds of a set of operations (except for a 
final interchanged of blocks). Each round is calculated as follows: 
Li = Ri-l 
Ri = Li_i Wf(Ri.i,KLi) 
f(Ri.l,Ki)=:P(S(E(Ri.i(4-) Ki))) 
The encryption function f is a concatenation of a modulo 2 addition and three functions E, 
S, and P, which takes as input the 32-bit right data half Rj.i and the 32-bit left key half 
KLj, and produces a 32-bit result which is added modulo 2 to the left data half L^.i. 
The key schedule KS is responsible for deriving the sub-keys K ,̂ and is defined in the 
following way. 
the 64-bit key K is partitioned into two 32-bit halves KL and KR. 
For odd numbered rounds 
Ki = KL;., 
KL; = R0L(KLi.i,13) 
KRj — KRj_j 
For even numbered rounds 
Ki = KL;., 
KLi = R0L(KLi.i,12) 
KRj = KRj_| 
After the 16 rounds, the two output block halves L^^ and Rjg are then concatenated 
together to form the output block. 
The deciyption computation is identical to that used for encryption, save that the partial 
keys used as input to the function f in each round are calculated in reverse order. 
For a detailed description of LOKI algorithms, the reader is referred to [Bro90] and 
[Bro91]. 
A C program loki is implemented by using the algorithm proposed in [Bro90] and 
[Bro91]. The full source listing of the program is presented in the appendix section. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program loki, which is run to encrypt 100Kb block 
under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation for 8, 16, 24, 32 
rounds and four modes in table 4.3. 
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Figure 4.11 LOKI Overall Structure 
Table 4.3 Program loki performance 
Fujitsu HP 
mode ECB CBC CFB OFB ECB CBC CFB OFB 
round 
8 1.5 1.5 12.4 12.4 2.8 2.8 22.1 23.2 
16 3.1 3.1 24.6 24.6 5.7 5.8 44.1 43.6 
24 4.6 4.6 36.9 37.0 8.4 8.5 68.7 68.8 
32 6.2 6.2 49.2 49.1 10.8 11.2 90.8 89.4 
The results show that for the same number of rounds, ECB and CBC modes take less time 
to process than the CFB and OFM modes. 
5.4. The KHUFU Cryptographic Primitive 
The KHUFU is another block cipher operating on 64-bit blocks proposed by R.C.Merkle 
[Mer90]. It is a multi-round encryption algorithm in which two 32-bit halves (called L and 
R) are used alternately in the computation. Each half is used as input to a function F, 
whose output is XORed with the other half. The number of rounds is a multiple of 8. 
The 64-bit plaintext is first divided into two 32-bit words designated L and R. L is bytes 0 
through 3, and R is bytes 4 through 7 of the 64-bit plaintext. L and R are then XORed with 
two 32-bit words of auxiliaiy key material. Then the main loop is started, in which byte 3 
(the least significant byte) of L is used as the input to a 256-entry S-box. Each S box entry 
is 32 bits wide. The selected 32-bit entry is XORed with R. L is then rotated to bring a new 
byte into position, after which L and R are swapped. The S box itself is changed to a new 
S box after every 8 rounds. This means that the number of S-boxes required depends on 
the number of rounds of encryption used: one new S-box for every octet (8 rounds). 
Finally, after the main loop has been completed, we again XOR L and R with two new 32-
bit auxiliary key values to produce the cipheitext. 
The decryption algorithm is the reverse of the encryption algorithm. 




SBoxes: ARRAY [L.enough/8] OF ARRAY [0..255] OF int32 
Auxiliai-yKeys: ARRAY[1..4] OFint32; 
rotateSchedule: ARRAY[L.9] = [16,16,8,8,16,16,24,24] 
octet: integer 
L = L XOR AuxiliaiyKeys[l] 
R = R XOR Auxiliai7Keys[2] 
octet = 1 
FOR round=l TO enough DO 
Begin 
R = R XOR SBoxes[octet][L AND #FF] 
L = RotateRight[L,rotateSchedule[(round-l) mod 8 + 1] 
SWAP[L,R] 
if (round mod 8=0) then octet = octet + 1 
End 
L = L XOR Auxiliai7Keys[3] 
R = R XOR AuxiHaryKeys[4] 
The purpose of the rotation schedule is to bring new bytes into position so that all 8 bytes 
of input are used in the first 8 rounds. This means that a change in any single input bit is 
guaranteed to force the use of a different S-box entry with 8 rounds. And the secondary 
purpose of the rotation schedule is to restore the data to its original rotational position after 
8 rounds.The same S-box entiy will never be used twice. 
The S-boxes are most of the key. So the computation of it is the most crucial component in 
ensuring the security of the algorithm. The essential idea is to generate the S-boxes in a 
pseudo-random fashion from a user supplied key so that they satisfy one property: all four 
of the one-byte columns in each S box must be permutations. 
In practice, this procedure is done as follows: first, generate a stream of good pseudo-
random bytes; second, use the stream of pseudo-random bytes to generate four pseudo-
random permutations that map 8 bits to 8 bits. These four pseudo-random permutations are 
the generated S-box. We repeat this process until additional S-boxes are enough for 
encryption process. 
The process of calculating S-box can be viewed algorithmically as follows: 
FOR octet=l TO enougli/8 DO 
SB ox = initialSBox 
FOR column = 0 TO 3 DO 
BEGIN 
FOR i=0 TO 255 DO 
BEGIN 
randomRow = RandomInRange[i,255] 
SwapBytes[ SBox[i,column], SBox[randomRow,column]]; 
END 
SBoxes[octet] = SB ox 
END 
For a detailed description of the Khufu algorithm, the reader is referred to [Mer90]. 
A C program khufu is implemented by using the algorithm proposed in [Mer90]. The full 
source Usting of the program is presented at the appendix section. 
In the implementation of the program khufu, the initial S box is initialised with fixed 
values. The S box is computed by using the cipher chaining mode of the khufu algorithm 
itself to enciypt the initial S-box with a user-supplied key and a fixed initial vector V. This 
process ensures that the computed S-box is unique and dependent on the user key. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program khufu, which is run to encrypt 100Kb 
block under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation for 8,16, 24, 32 
rounds and four modes in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Program khufu performance 
Fujitsu HP 
mode ECB CBC CFB OFB ECB CBC CFB OFB 
round 
8 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.9 2.0 
16 0.2 0.2 1.5 1.5 0.4 0.4 3.3 3.3 
24 0.3 0.3 2.1 2.1 0.5 0.6 4.8 4.5 
32 0.4 0.4 2.7 2.7 0.6 0.7 5.7 6.1 
The results show that for the same number of rounds, ECB and CBC modes take less time 
to process than the CFB and OFM modes. 
4.5. The KHAFRE Cryptographic Primitive 
The Khafre is another 64-bit encryption and decryption algorithm proposed by R.Merkle 
[Mer90], which is similar with the Khufu algorithm except that Khafre does not 
precompute its S-box. Instead, Khafre uses a set of standard S-boxes. The standard S 
boxes are different with the initial S boxes in Khufu. 
The use of standard S-boxes means that Khafre can quickly encrypt a single 64-bit block 
without the lengthy computation used in Khufu. 
The decryption algorithm is the reverse of the encryption algorithm. 
The encryption of a single 64-bit plaintext by Khafre can be described algorithmically as 
follows: 
L, R: int32 
standardSBoxes: ARRAY[1..enough/8] OF ARRAY [0..255] OF int32 
key: ARRAY[0..keySize-l] OF ARRAY [0..1] of int32 
key Index: [0..keySize-l] 
rotateSchedule: ARRAY[1..8] = [16,16,8,8,16,16,24,24] 
L = LXORkey[0][0] 
R = RXORkey[0][l] 
keylndex = 1 MOD keySize 
octet = 1 
FOR round = 1 TO enough DO 
BEGIN 
L = L XOR standardSBoxes[octet][R AND #FF] 
R = RotateRight[R,rotateSchedule[round mod 8 + 1]] 
SWAP[L,R] 
IF round MOD 8 = 0 THEN 
BEGIN 
L = L XOR rotateRight[key[keyIndex][0],octet] 
R = R XOR rotateRight[key[keyIndex][l],octet] 
keylndex = keylndex + 1 
IF keylndex = keySize THEN keylndex = 0 
octet = octet + 1 
END 
END 
For a detailed description of the Khafre algorithm, the reader is referred to [Mer90]. 
In the program khrafre, the standard S-box is computed by initialising it with fixed values. 
According to the khafre enciyption algorithm, this is sufficient because the standard S-box 
can not serve as the key, the key mixing is computed by exclusive-oring the key with the 
64-bit data block before tlie first round and tiiereafter following every 8 rounds. 
A C program khafre is implemented by using the algorithm proposed in [Mer90]. The fuU 
source listing of C program is presented in the appendix section. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program khafre, which is run to encrypt 100Kb 
block under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation for 8,16, 24,32 
rounds and four modes table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Program khafre performance 
Fujitsu HP 
mode ECB CBC CFB OFB ECB CBC CFB OFB 
round 
8 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 2.0 2.0 
16 0.2 0.2 1.5 1.5 0.4 0.4 3.4 3.5 
24 0.3 0.3 2.2 2.2 0.6 0.6 5.1 5.2 
32 0.4 0.4 2.8 2.9 0.8 0.8 6.7 6.7 
The results show that for the same number of rounds, ECB and CBC modes take less time 
to process than the CFB and OEM modes. 
5. Block Cipher Cryptanalysis 
Any discussion on symmetric block cryptosystems is not complete without mentioning 
cryptanalysis attacks against the cryptosystems. There are several types of attacks which 
can be used to determine the security level of a cryptosystem: ciphertext-only attack, 
known-plaintext attack, chosen plaintext attack. 
A ciphertext-only attack is where a system is attempted to be compromised by examining 
encrypted messages, or cipher, and refening to related secondary information. Any system 
whose security cannot weather a ciphertext-only attack is considered inadequate and totally 
insecure [Seb89]. 
A known-plaintext attack is when a system is attempted to be compromised with the 
cryptanalyst being in possession of plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext. If a system 
can withstand a known-plaintext attack, this is taken as a reasonable indication that the 
system is secure. In 1977 the NBS accepted the DES system on the basis of it resisting a 
known plaintext attack. 
A chosen-plaintext attack is when a system is attempted to be compromised with unlimited 
amount of plaintext and its conesponding ciphertext chosen by the cryptanalyst. 
The common attacks against DES require ¡2 encryptions [Sim92]. Although there has 
been no success against the full DES algorithm, there has been cryptanalysis success in 
breaking one of the proposed modes of operation of DES. In output feedback mode (ofb), 
DES is used to generate a pseudorandom number, which is then used as one-time pad to 
encrypt the message. If the number of shift-left bits is less than 64, the expected cycle size 
for a random function on N elements is only about Therefore only the number of 
shift-left bits is equal to 64 should be considered secure for ofb mode [Dav82]. 
The most powerful tool for analysing block ciphers currently known is differential 
cryptanalysis [Bih91a], [Bro91]. It has been used to find design deficiencies in many of 
the new ciphers. Differential ciyptanalysis is a dynamic attack against a cipher and it 
belongs to the chosen plaintext attack type. In general, differential cryptanalysis is much 
faster than exhaustive search for a certain number of rounds in the cipher, however there is 
a break-even point where it becomes slower than exhaustive search. The differential 
cryptanalysis technique uses a veiy large number of chosen plaintext pairs, which through 
a statistical analysis of the resulting ciphertext pairs, can be used to determine the key in 
use. By using this technique Biham and Shamir [Bih91a] showed that DES with six 
rounds was broken in less than 0.3 seconds on a personal computer using 240 ciphertext. 
DES with 15 rounds can be broken in about 2̂ 2 steps but DES with 16 rounds still requires 
258 steps (which is slightly higher than the exhaustive search - 2^6). At Crypto'92, Biham 
and Shamir presented a new variant of differential cryptanalysis that is capable of breaking 
a 16-round DES significantly faster than by exhaustive search. 
Using a chosen plaintext attack with 100-10000 encryptions, FEAL-4 was broken by Den-
Boer [Boe88]. And by using differential cryptanalysis, FEAL-8 can be broken with less 
than 2000 chosen plaintexts, and to break FEAL-N for N less than 32 with fewer chosen 
plaintexts than the number of enciyptions needed in an exhaustive seai'ch [Sim92]. 
The original Loki encryption algorithm, LOKI89, with up to eleven rounds is breakable 
faster than exhaustive search by differential cryptanalysis attacks, either chosen plaintext or 
known plaintext attacks. Biham and Shamir also showed that every key of Loki has 15 
equivalent keys due to a key complementation propeity and thus the complexity of a known 
plaintext attack on the full 16-round version can be reduced to 2^0. An alternate attack 
using a 3 round characteristic that can break up to 14 rounds of LOKI89 was found 
independently by Knudsen and Kwan. Up to 10 rounds of LOKI89 can be broken using a 
2 round characteristic, and up to 12 rounds using a 3 round characteristic [Knu91]. 
Khafre with 16 rounds is breakable by a differential cryptanalysis chosen plaintext attack 
using about 1500 encryptions within about an hour on a personal computer. By a 
differential cryptanalysis known plaintext attack it is breakable using about 2^^ 
encryptions. Khafre with 24 rounds is breakable by a chosen plaintext attack using about 
2^^ encryptions and using a differential known plaintext attack it is breakable using about 
2^9 encryptions. 
Differential ciyptanalysis techniques are also applicable to hash functions, in addition to 
cryptosystems. 
6. Block Cipher-Based Hash Functions 
The simplest way to obtain the digital signature of a message is to apply asymmetric 
cryptography to the whole message. But the public key systems generally encrypt more 
slowly than conventional ciphers such as DES, FEAL, etc. And it is usually undesirable to 
apply digital signature techniques direct to a long message because it doubles the amount 
of intoi-mation to be transmitted or stored. But on the other hand, the requirements that the 
entire message must be signed. This is seemingly contradictor, but a heuristic solution can 
be obtained by using a hash function as an intermediaiy. A hash function accepts a variable 
size message M as input and outputs a fixed size representation H(M) of M, sometimes 
called a message digest. In general, H(M) is much smaller than M. A digital signature may 
be applied to H(M) directly and processing time is relatively quick. A hash function can 
also serve to detect modification of a message, independently from any signature schemes. 
That is, it can serve as a cryptographic checksum or message authentication code (MAC). 
The general scheme can be describe in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 Using compress block to obtain n-bit message digest 
A one-way function is defined as a function F such that for every x in the domain of F, 
F(x) is easy to compute; but for virtually all y in the range of F, it is computationally 
infeasible to find an x such that y = F(x). Tliis is not a precise mathematical definition. 
Merkle [Mer82] defines a hash function f to be a transformation with the following 
properties: 
1. F can be applied to an argument of any size, 
2. F produces a fixed size output, 
3. F(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x, 
4. For any given y it is computationally infeasible to find x with F(x) = y, 
5. For any fixed x it is computationally infeasible to find x' (not equal to x) with F(x') = 
F(x). 
The security of the hash function may be classified further as weak and strong hash 
functions. A function satisfying 1-5 is called a weak hash function. On the other hand, a 
hash function is called a strong hash function when modifying the condition 5 to that it is 
computationally infeasible to find any {xl, x2} with H(xl) = H(x2). 
The use of one-way hash functions to produce message digests is very different from use 
of trapdoor one-way functions to generate encryption functions in an asymmetric cipher. In 
asymmetric cryptosystems, the condition 4 becomes that it is computationally infeasible for 
anyone to find plaintext from ciphertext except intended receiver who has the private key to 
decrypt the ciphertext. 
To be useful in conjunction with public key systems, a hash function should ideally be 
keyless. This is in contradistinction to message authentication codes used in connection 
with secret key systems. 
Many proposals have been made for one-way hash functions based on block ciphers. Hash 
functions based on symmetric block cryptosystems are examples of key-hash function. A 
family of message digest md4 [Riv90], md5 [Riv91], and haval [Zhe92] are examples of 
keyless hash functions. 
6.1. Cipher block chaining hashing 
The most obvious way of using a block cipher is to construct a message digest is based on 
the standard mode of use for a block cipher called cipher block chaining (cbc). This is an 
example of key hashed function. In this mode of use the message is divided into a 
sequence of n-bit blocks, M^, M2,...,M]^. The sequence Cj is then derived, Q = E]j.(Ci.i 
XOR Mj). Then, the derived message digest is C^. In order to protect messages against 
their digests being forged using the birthday attack, a scheme (Figure 6.2) is used [Seb89]. 
In this case, every key input is the same, namely K. It can be considered an initial 
condition of the system. The sequence of successive cryptograms generated in the system 
is described as follows: 
Ci = Ek(Mi) 
C2 = Ek(M2 XOR Ci) 
Ck = Ek(Mk XOR Ck.i) 
Hk(M) = Ek(Mi XOR M2 XOR ....XOR M^ XOR C^) 
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Figure 6.2 Compressing system with a single round 
6.2. Single block hash (SBH) mode 
The SBH mode is proposed by L.Brown, J.Pieprzyk, and J.Seberry in [Bro90]. Data for 
which a hash is to be computed is divided into 64-bit blocks, the final block being padded 
with nulls if required. A 64-bit key is supplied, and is used as the initial hash value IV. For 
each message block M :̂ that block is added modulo 2 to the previous hash value to form a 
key. That key is used to encrypt the previous hash value. The encrypted value is added 
modulo 2 to the previous hash value to forai the new hash value. The SBH code is the final 
hash value. 
The SBH process may be described as: 
Ho = IV 
Hi = EncryptM. XOR HI.i(Hi.i) XOR Hj., 
SBH = H, 
H. i-1 < Encrypt Hi 
Figure 6.3 Single Block Hashing (SBH) 
A C program sbh is implemented by using the above schemes (cbc and sbh modes) with 
five 64-bit block cipher algorithms (des, feal, loki, khufu, and khafre). The full source 
listing of the program is presented in the appendix section. 
6.3. Two-n bit hash function using n-bit block cipher 
This hash function has been proposed by J.Quisquater and M.Girault [Qui89] as a means 
to provides 2n-bit results (double block hash), using any n-bit symmetric block cipher 
algorithms. The function can be considered as an extension of an already known one, 
which only provided n-bit hash results. 
The following is the general description of algorithm: 
Let e be a symmetric block-cipher algorithm, whose block length is n and key length is k 
(n=64 and k=56 for DBS). We denote the encipherment of input X under key K by Ejj.(X) 
(Figure 6.4). Let I and J be two n-bit initializing values. Then, the message digest H of a 
binary message M is calculated in four steps. 
Step 1 (splitting): 
M is split into k-bit blocks M^, M2,.... 
Step 2 
If the number of blocks is odd, a supplementary block filled with O's is added. Let n = 
2m be the number of blocks at the end of this step. 
Step 3 
Two supplementary blocks are added to the message. The first one, M^+i, is equal to 
the XOR of all the preceding blocks: 
Mn+i = Ml + M2 + + M„ 
The second one, Mn+2> is equal to the addition modulo - 1 of the same blocks: 
Mn+2 = Ml + M2 + + Mn modulo - 1 
Step 4 
The output values Hi, H2, B^+2 are calculated in the following iterative way 
for i from 0 to m 
do 
H i = I 
Ho = J 
^(2i+l) = E2i+i(H2j.i) XOR H2i 
^(2i+2) = E2i+2(H2i+i) XOR H2i 
^21+1 = ^21+2 ^ ^ ^ 
^21+2 = ^21+1 XOR H2i.i 
done 
The hashing value is formed by concatenating the fmal two hash values: DBH = H^.i II Hjj 
The sketch of the algorithm is as follows: 
Figure 6.4 Two-n bit hash function using n-bit symmetric block cipher algorithm 
For a detailed description of the algoritlim, the reader is referred to [Qui89]. 
6.4. Double block hashing (DBH) 
The double block hash, proposed by L.Brown, J.Pieprzyk, and J.Seberry [Bro90] is a 
variant of the two-n bit hash in the above section. Data for which a hash is to be computed 
is divided into pairs of 64-bit blocks M2i+i, M21+2, the final block being padded with nulls 
if required. A 128-bit key is supplied, composed of two 64-bit blocks, which are used as 
the initial hash value IV. IVq. 
H-i = IV , 
Ho = IVo 
For each pair of message blocks M2i+i M2i+2. the following calculation is performed: 
T = EncyptMji^j XOR H^i.iCHa-i XOR M^m) XOR M2M XOR Hj; 
H2i,i = EncryptM2.^2XOR H2i(T XOR M2i,i) XOR M2i,i XOR H j n XOR H^; 
H2i,2 = T XOR H2i.i 
The DBH is formed by concatenating the final two hash values: DBH = Hĵ .̂  II Hĵ  
The sketch of the algorithm is as follows: 
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Figure 6.5 Double Block Hashing (DBH) 
This scheme is an extended version of Quisquater and Girault [Qui89] in the section 6.4, 
by using addition modulo 2 of the previous hash value to the current message block before 
using it as key input to the encryption primitive. 
A C program dbh is implemented by applying the above algorithm. The program produces 
128-bit message digest from an arbitrarily long message, and it uses a known 64-bit block 
cipher encryption algorithm, such as des, feal, loki, khufu, or khafre (by selecting the 
appropriate option). The full source listing of the program is presented in the appendix 
section. 
7. Keyless Hashing Algorithms 
7.1. Message digest algorithms - MD4, MD4X and MD5 
The MD4 and MD5 Message Digest Algorithms, by R.Rivest and RSA Data Security, Inc., 
are intended for file hashing and they do not require a key. Although this can be modified 
to accept a key and initialize the four long words (processing buffers) with the key values: 
The algorithms accept arbitrarily large inputs and produce an output of 128 bits. 
Both algorithms are based on complex nonlinear functions which are difficult to invert in 
practice, similar to the philosophy used to design DES-like ciphers. But the formal proof of 
the security of the two hash functions have not yet been estabUshed. 
Below is a general description of the MD4 message digest algorithm is given. For a 
detailed description, the reader is referred to [Riv90]. 
The processing of MD4 consists of four steps: 
Step 1 
Append padding bits and the message length: a single "1" bit, (1-1) zero bits (1 is 
between 1 and 512) and 64-bit representation of b mod are appended to the 
message such that the length b + 1 + 64 of the extended message is a multiple of 
512. The 64 bits containing the message length are appended as two 32-bit words, 
low-order word first. The new message is now represented as a sequence M[0], 
M[l],....,M[n-l] of n words, where n is a multiple of 16. 
Step 2 
Step 3 
Initialize a 4-word buffer (A,B,C,D) in hexadecimal with the following values. 
A=67452301; B=EFCDAB89; C=98BADCFE; D=10325476 
Process the message in 16-word blocks: 
fori=0to(n/16)-l do 
begin 
for j=0 to 15 do 
X[j]=M[16i+j]; 
(AA,BB,CC,DD) = (A,B,C,D) 
[Round 1] 
Let [A B C D i s] denote the operation A = (A + f(B,C,D) + X[i]) « s, where 
f(X,Y,Z) = ((X and Y) or ((not X) and Z)). 
Do the following 16 operations: 
[ A B C D 0 3 ] 
[D A B C 17] 
[CD A B 2 11] 
[ B C D A3 19] 
[A B C D 4 3] 
[D A B C 5 7] 
[C D A B 6 11] 
[ B C D A7 19] 
[A B C D 8 3] 
[D A B C 9 7] 
[CD A B 10 11] 
[ B C D A 11 19] 
[ A B C D 12 3] 
[D A B C 13 7] 
[CD A B 14 11] 
[B C D A 15 19] 
[Round 2] 
Let [A B C D i s] denote the operation A = (A + g(B,C,D) + X[i] + 
5a827999) « s, where g(X,Y,Z) = ((X and Y) or (X and Z) or (Y and Z)). 
Do the following 16 operations: 
[A B C D 0 3] 
[D A B C 4 5 ] 
[C D A B 8 9] 
[ B C D A 1 2 13] 
[ A B C D 1 3 ] 
[D A B C 5 5] 
[CD A B 9 9] 
[ B C D A 13 13] 
[A B C D 2 3] 
[D A B C 6 5 ] 
[CD A B 109] 
[ B C D A 1 4 13] 
[A B C D 3 3] 
[D A B C 7 5] 
[CD A B 119] 
[B C D A 15 13] 
[Round 3] 
Let [A B C D i s] denote the operation A = (A + h(B,C,D) + X[i] + 
6ed9ebal) « s, where h(X,Y,Z) = (X xor Y xor Z). 
Do the following 16 operations: 
[ A B C D 0 3 ] 
[D A B C 8 9] 
[ C D A B 4 1 1 ] 
[B C D A 12 15] 
[A B C D 2 3] 
[D A B C 10 9] 
[CD A B 6 11] 
[B C D A 14 15] 
[A B C D 1 3] 
[D A B C 9 9 ] 
[CD A B 5 11] 
[B C D A 13 15] 
[A B C D 3 3] 
[ D A B C 1 1 9 ] 
[CD A B 7 11] 
[B C D A 15 15] 
Then perform the following additions: 
A = A + AA; 
B = B + BB 
C = C + CC 
D = D + D D 
end; 
Step 4 
The output is the 4-word buffer (A,B,C,D) 
The extension of nid4: the basic MD4 algorithm is extended to produce 256-bit digest 
message. Rivest suggested [Riv90] the use of two copies of MD4 are run in parallel over 
the input. The first copy is standard as above. The second copy is modified as follows: 
The initial state of the second copy is 33221100, 77665544, bbaa9988, and ffeeddcc. After 
every 16-word block is processed (including the last block), the values of the A registers in 
the two copies are exchanged. The final message digest is obtained by appending the result 
of the second copy of MD4 to the end of the result of the first copy of MD4. 
The MD5 message-digest algorithm is a strengthened version of MD4 [Riv91]. It has four 
rounds instead of three, and incoiporates other features: each step having a unique additive 
constant, the function g in round 2 was changed to make it less symmetric, each step 
adding the result of the previous step to promote a faster avalanche effect, the order of 
input words are accessed in round 2 and round 3 is changed. 
For a detailed description of MD5, the reader is referred to [Riv91]. 
Three C programs md4, md4x, and md5 are implemented based on the algorithms 
proposed in [Riv90] and [Riv91]. The program md4x is the extended version of md4 to 
produce 256-bit message digest. The full source listings of the programs are presented in 
the appendix section. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program md4, which is run to produce message 
digest for 10Mb block under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation 
are 14.3 sees and 80.3 sees respectively. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program md4x, which is run to produce message 
digest for 10Mb block under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation 
are 22.4 sees and 150.5 sees respectively. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program md5, which is run to produce message 
digest for 10Mb block under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation 
are 2.0 sees and 10.5 sees respectively. 
7.2, HAVAL - A one-way hashing algorithm with variable length of output 
The one-way hashing algorithm HAVAL, by Y.Zheng, Centre for Computer Security 
Research, University of Wollongong, is a deterministic algorithm that compresses an 
arbitrary long message into a message digest of specified length. The output value 
represents the digest or fingerprint of the message. HAVAL compresses a message of 
arbitrary length into a digest of 128 bits, 160 bits, 192 bits, 224 bits or 256 bits. In 
addition, HAVAL has a parameter that controls the number of passes a message block (of 
1024 bits) is to be processed. A message block can be processed in two, three or four 
passes, the minimum number of passes to be processed is 2. 
The algorithm makes use of different Boolean function with each pass operation. The 
Boolean functions have veiy nice properties [Zhe92], which are 
-0-1 balanced, 
- High non-linearity, 
- Satisfying the Strict Avalanche Criterion, 
- Lineaiiy inequivalent in sti'ucture, and 
- Output-uncoiTelated. 
The sketch of the algorithm can be summaiised as follows. The full details of the algorithm 
can be found in [Zeh92]. 
HAVAL processes a message M in the following three steps: 
Step 1: 
Pad the message M so that its length becomes a multiple of 1024. The last (or the 
most significant) block of the padded message indicates the length of the original 
(unpadded) message M, the required length of the digest of M, the number of 
passes each block is processed and the version number of HAVAL. 
Step 2 
Calculate repeatedly - H(DI ,BI ) for i from 0 to n-1, where Dq is a 8-word 
(256-bit) constant string and n is the total number of blocks in the padded message. 
Step 3 
Adjust the 256-bit value Dn obtained in the above calculation according to the digest 
length specified in the last block B^.i , and output the adjusted value as the digest 
of the message M. 
For justification of the design and the boolean functions, the reader is referred to [Zhe92]. 
A C program haval is implemented by using the algorithm proposed in [Zhe92]. The full 
source listing of the program is presented in the appendix section. 
The processing time (in seconds) of the program md4, which is run to produce message 
digest for 10Mb block under Fujitsu Mainframe M-780, and Hewlett Packard Workstation 
is as follows 
Fujitsu 
Digest 128 bits 160 bits 192 bits 224 bits 256 bits 
Pass 
2 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
3 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
4 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 
HP 
Digest 128 bits 160 bits 192 bits 224 bits 256 bits 
Pass 
2 19.5 19.1 18.9 19.0 19.0 
3 28.1 28.0 28.2 28.2 28.2 
4 38.6 38.7 38.8 39.2 38.9 
The results show that for a given number of passes (2, 3, or 4 passes), die processing time 
for different message digests (128, 160, 192, 224, or 256 bits) varies insignificantly. 
8. UNIX Style Manual Pages 
The followings are UNIX manual pages for all command implemented with the algorithms 
described in the previous sections. 
Commands are presented with UNIX-style convention for documentation. A manual page 
starting with a number of (1) is the command can be entered at the shell prompt, and a 
manual page starting with a number of (3c) is the C library subroutine which provides a 
low level access to a cryptographic piimitive. 




des - data encryption standard 
SYNOPSIS 
des [[-el-d] -k key -mode -r round -f file I -t] 
DESCRIPTION 
DES is the official encryption standard published by the US National Bureau of 
Standards, 1977. DES is symmetric block cipherment algorithm acting on 64 bits 
of plaintext to produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. Deciphering is 
done by using the same key as for enciphering. DES operates with four modes: 
electronic code book (ecb), cipher block chaining (cbc), cipher feedback (cfb), and 
output feedback (ofb). The cbc mode is the default mode and it is recommended for 
encryption for increased security. The cfb and ofb modes have the same level of 
security with cbc mode, but the iTinning time is a bit slower. 
The standard version of DES run with 8 rounds and 64-bit key (8 characters). The 
extensions to DES have been implemented with this version. The number of rounds 
has been increased to 32. 
Options: 
-e encryption; the default is enciyption; 
-d deciyption; 
-k user-supplied key; if the key is not supplied with the command line, user will be 
asked for the key interactively; the minimum number of characters for the key is 5. 
-m mode, valid modes are ecb, cbc, cfb, ofb; cipher block chaining is the default 
mode of operation; 
-r round, the number of rounds used in enciphering or deciphering a block of data, 
valid values from 4 to 32 rounds. The more number of rounds of the enciphering, 
the higher security of the cipher data; the default value is 8; 
-f input file, if this option is used, the resulting encryption file will be written to the 
same name with an extension .e; 
-t time trial testing for algorithm running speed. 
Since the key is an argument to the des command, it is potentially visible to users 
executing ps(l) or a derivative. It is advisable to let the des command prompt for 
the key and enter it interactively. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher block chaining with 8 rounds, and fredl2345 
as the key: 
des -kfred 12345 -ffoo 
2. To deci7pt the file foo.e 
des -d -kfredl2345 -f foo.e 
3. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher feedback mode (cfb) with 32 rounds: 
des -m cfb -r 32 -f foo 
4. To decrypt the file foo.e: 
des -d -m cfb -r 32 foo.e 
5. To enciypt a file foo, and the encrypted output is sent to file fool: 
des < foo > foo 1 
6. To time trial test FEAL with mode cbc and 32 rounds 
des -t -m cbc -r 32 
WARNING 
If two or more files enciypted with the same key are concatenated and an attempt is 
made to decrypt the result, only tlie first of original files is deciypted correctly. 
SEE ALSO 
feal, loki, khufu, khafre, sbh, dbh, md4, md4x, md5, and haval. 
AUTHORS 
National Bureau of Standards, US. 
des(3c) 
NAME 
EnDes, DeDes, Des_GetKeySchedule - encrypt and deciypt a DES data block 
SYNOPSIS 
EnDes(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long des_keyschedule[64], int round) 
DeDes(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long des_keyschedule[64], int round) 
Des_GetKeySchedule(charkey[8], unsigned long des_keyschdule[64], int round) 
DESCRIPTION 
The C routines - EnDes, DeDes, Des_GetKeySchedule - provide low level access 
to the Data Enciyption Standard algorithm. 
DES is the official encryption standard published by the US National Bureau of 
Standards, 1977. DES is symmetric block cipherment algorithm acting on 64 bits 
of plaintext to produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. Deciphering is 
done by using the same key as for enciphering. 
The standard version of DES run with 8 rounds and 64-bit key. The extensions to 
DES have been implemented with this version. The number of rounds has been 
increased to 32. 
The routine Des_GetKeySchedule sets up the key schedule from the 64-bit standard 
key (8-chai-acter key). This routine must be called before callmg EnDes, or DeDes. 
The routine EnDes encrypts a 64-bit block with the supplied key schedule. 
The routine DeDes decrypts a 64-bit block with the supplied key schedule. 
Round is the number of rounds to encrypt or decrypt the data block (minimum 
number is 16, maximum number is 32). 
SEE ALSO 
feal(3c), loki,(3c) khufu(3c), khafre(3c). 
feal(l) 
NAME 
feal - fast encryption algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
feal [[-el-d] -k key -mode -r round -f file I -t] 
DESCRIPTION 
FEAL is symmetric block encryption algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to 
produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. It is designed to run fast with 
software implementation. Deciphering is done by using the same key as for 
enciphering. FEAL operates with four modes: electronic code book (ecb), cipher 
block chaining (cbc), cipher feedback (cfb), and output feedback (obf). The cbc 
mode is the default mode and it is recommended for encryption for increased 
security. The cfb and ofb modes have the same level of security with cbc mode, but 
the running time is a bit slower. 
The standai-d version of FEAL mn with 8 rounds and 64-bit key (8 characters). The 
extensions to FEAL have been implemented with this version. The number of 
rounds has been increased to 32, and the number of key bits increased to 128 (the 
maximum number of characters of the key is 16). 
Options: 
-e encryption; the default is enciyption; 
-d decryption; 
-k user-supplied key; if the key is not supplied with the command line, user will be 
asked for the key interactively; the minimum number of characters for the key is 5; 
-m mode, valid modes are ecb, cbc, cfb, ofb; cipher block chaining is the default 
mode of operation; 
-r round, the number of rounds used in enciphering or deciphering a block of data, 
valid values from 4 to 32 rounds. The more number of rounds of the enciphering, 
the higher security of the cipher data; the default value is 8; 
-f input file, if this option is used, the resulting encryption file will be written to the 
same name with an extension .e; 
-t time trial testing for algorithm mnning speed. 
Since the key is an argument to the feal command, it is potentially visible to users 
executing ps(l) or a derivative. It is advisable to let the feal command prompt for 
the key and enter it interactively. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher block chaining with 8 rounds, and fredl2345 
as the key: 
feal -kfredl2345 -ffoo 
2. To decrypt the file foo.e 
feal -d -kfredl2345 -f foo.e 
3. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher feedback mode (cfb) with 32 rounds: 
feal-m e f t - r 32 -ffoo 
4. To decrypt the file foo.e: 
feal -d -m cfb -r 32 foo.e 
5. To encrypt a file foo, and the enciypted output is sent to file fool: 
feal < foo > fool 
6. To time trial test FEAL with mode cbc and 32 rounds 
feal -t -m cbc -r 32 
WARNING 
If two or more files encrypted with the same key are concatenated and an attempt is 
made to decrypt the result, only the first of original files is decrypted correctly. 
SEE ALSO 
des, loki, khufu, khafre, sbh, dbh, md4, md4x, md5, and haval. 
AUTHORS 
The algorithm was originally designed by A.Shimizu and S.Miyaguchi, Electrical 
Communication Laboratories, NTT, Japan. 
feal(3c) 
NAME 
EnFeal, DeFeal, Feal_GetKeySchedule - encrypt and decrypt a FEAL data block 
SYNOPSIS 
EnFeal(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long feal_keyschedule[64], int round) 
DeFeal(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long feal_keyschedule[64], int round) 
Feal_GetKeySchedule(char key[8], unsigned long feal_keyschdule[64], int round) 
DESCRIPTION 
The C routines - EnFeal, DeFeal, Feal_GetKeySchedule - provide low level access 
to the Fast Encryption algorithm. 
FEAL is symmetric block encryption algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to 
produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. It is designed to run fast with 
software implementation. Deciphering is done by using the same key as for 
enciphering. 
The routine Feal_GetKeySchedule sets up the key schedule from the 64-bit 
standard key (8-character key). This routine must be called before calling EnFeal, 
or DeFeal. 
The routine EnFeal encrypts a 64-bit block with the supplied key schedule. 
The routine DeFeal decrypts a 64-bit block with the supplied key schedule. 
Round is the number of rounds to encrypt or decrypt the data block (minimum 
number is 16, maximum number is 32). 
SEE ALSO 
des(3c), loki,(3c) khufu(3c), khafre(3c). 
loki(l) 
NAME 
loki - LOKI enciyption algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
loki [[-el-d] -k key -mode -r round -f file I -t] 
DESCRIPTION 
LOKI is symmetric block encryption algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to 
produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. Decryption is done by using 
the same key as for encryption. LOKI operates with four modes: electronic code 
book (ecb), cipher block chaining (cbc), cipher feedback (cfb), and output feedback 
(obf). The cbc mode is the default mode and it is recommended for encryption for 
increased security. The cfb and ofb modes have the same level of security with cbc 
mode, but the running time is a bit slower. 
The standard version of LOKI run with 8 rounds and 64-bit key (8 characters). The 
extensions to LOKI have been implemented with this version. The number of 
rounds has been increased to 32. 
Options: 
-e enciyption; the default is encryption; 
-d decryption; 
-k user-supplied key; if the key is not supplied with the command line, user will be 
asked for the key interactively; the minimum number of characters for the key is 5; 
-m mode, valid modes are ecb, cbc, cfb, ofb; cipher block chaining is the default 
mode of operation; 
-r round, the number of rounds used in enciphering or deciphering a block of data, 
valid values from 4 to 32 rounds. The more number of rounds of the enciphering, 
the higher security of the cipher data; the default value is 8; 
-f input file, if this option is used, the resulting encryption file will be written to the 
same name with an extension .e; 
-t time trial testing for algorithm running speed. 
Since the key is an argument to the loki command, it is potentially visible to users 
executing ps(l) or a derivative. It is advisable to let the loki command prompt for 
the key and enter it interactively. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To encrypt a file too, using cipher block chaining with 8 rounds, and fredl2345 
as the key: 
loki-k fredl2345 -ffoo 
2. To decrypt the file foo.e 
loki -d -kfred 12345 -f foo.e 
3. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher feedback mode (cfb) with 32 rounds: 
loki -m cfb -r 32 -f foo 
4. To decrypt the file foo.e: 
loki -d -m cfb -r 32 foo.e 
5. To encrypt a file foo, and the enci7pted output is sent to file fool: 
loki < foo > fool 
6. To time trial test LOKI with mode cbc and 32 rounds 
loki -t -m cbc -r 32 
WARNING 
If two or more files enciypted with the same key are concatenated and an attempt is 
made to decrypt the result, only tlie first of original files is decrypted correctly. 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, khufu, khafre, sbh, dbh, md4, md4x, md5, and haval. 
AUTHORS 
The algorithm was designed by L.Brown, M. Kwan, J.Pieprzyk, and J.Seberry; 
Department of Computer Science, University College, UNSW, Australian Defense 
Force Academy, Canberra. 
loki(3c) 
NAME 
EnLoki, DeLoki, Loki_GetKeySchedule - encrypt and decrypt a Loki data block 
SYNOPSIS 
EnLoki(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long feal_keyschedule[64], int round) 
DeLoki(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long feal_keyschedule[64], int round) 
Loki_GetKeySchedule(char key[8], unsigned long feal_keyschdule[64], int round) 
DESCRIPTION 
The C routines - EnLoki, DeLoki, Loki_GetKeySchedule - provide low level 
access to the Loki Enciyption algorithm. 
LOKI is symmetric block encryption algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to 
produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. Decryption is done by using 
the same key as for encryption. 
The routine Loki_GetKeySchedule sets up the key schedule from the 64-bit 
standard key (8-character key). This routine must be called before calling EnLoki, 
or DeLoki. 
The routine EnLolci encrypts a 64-bit block with the suppUed key schedule. 
The routine DeLoki decrypts a 64-bit block with the supplied key schedule. 
Round is the number of rounds to encrypt or decrypt the data block (minimum 
number is 16, maximum number is 32). 
SEE ALSO 
des(3c), feal(3c), khufu(3c), khafre(3c). 
khufu(l) 
NAME 
khufu - KHUFU enciyption algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
khufu [[-el-d] -k key -mode -r round -f file I -t] 
DESCRIPTION 
KHUFU is symmetric block encryption algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to 
produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. Decryption is done by using 
the same key as for encryption. KHUFU operates with four modes: electronic code 
book (ecb), cipher block chaining (cbc), cipher feedback (cfb), and output feedback 
(obf). The cbc mode is the default mode and it is recommended for encryption for 
increased security. The cfb and ofb modes have the same level of security with cbc 
mode, but the running time is a bit slower. 
The standard version of KHUFU run with 8 rounds and 64-bit key (8 characters). 
The number of rounds must be a multiple of 8. The extensions to KHUFU have 
been implemented with this version. The number of rounds has been increased to 
32. 
Options: 
-e enciyption; the default is encryption; 
-d decryption; 
-k user-supplied key; if the key is not supplied with the command line, user will be 
asked for the key interactively; the minimum number of chai'acters for the key is 5; 
-m mode, valid modes are ecb, cbc, cfb, ofb; cipher block chaining is the default 
mode of operation; 
-r round, the number of rounds used in enciphering or deciphering a block of data, 
valid values from 8 to 32 rounds. The more number of rounds of the enciphering, 
the higher security of the cipher data; the default value is 8; 
-f input file, if this option is used, the resulting encryption file will be written to the 
same name with an extension .e; 
-t time trial testing for algorithm running speed. 
Since the key is an argument to the khufu command, it is potentially visible to users 
executing ps(l) or a derivative. It is advisable to let the khufu command prompt for 
the key and enter it interactively. 
EXAMPLES 1. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher block chaining with 8 rounds, and fredl2345 as the key: 
khufu-kfredl2345 - f foo 
2. To deciypt the file foo.e 
khufu -d -kfred 12345 -f foo.e 
3. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher feedback mode (cfb) with 32 rounds: 
khufu-m cfb-r 32 -ffoo 
4. To decrypt the iile foo.e: 
khufu -d -m cfb -r 32 foo.e 
5. To encrypt a file foo, and the encrypted output is sent to file fool: 
khufu < foo > foo 1 
6. To time trial test KHUFU with mode cbc and 32 rounds 
khufu -t -m cbc -r 32 
WARNING 
If two or more files enciypted with the same key are concatenated and an attempt is made to decrypt the result, only the first of original files is decrypted correctly. 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, loki, khafre, sbh, dbh, md4, md4x, md5, and haval. 
AUTHORS The algorithm was designed by R.C.Merkle, Xerox PARC. 
khufu(3c) 
NAME 
EnKhufu, DeKhufu - enciypt and deciypt a Khufu data block 
InitialSboxSchedule, SboxSchedule - get khufu S-box schedule 
SYNOPSIS 
EnKliufu(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long Sbox[4][256], int round) 
DeKhufu(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long Sbox[4][256], int round) 
InitialSboxSchedule(unsigned long Sbox[4][256]) 
SboxSchedule(unsigned long initialSbox[4][256]»unsigned long Sbox[4][256], char key[8]) 
DESCRIPTION 
The C routines - EnKhufu, DeKhufu, InitialSboxSchedule, SboxSchedule -
provide low level access to the Khufu Encryption algorithm. 
Khufu is symmetric block enciyption algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to 
produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. Decryption is done by using 
the same key as for enciyption. 
The routines InitialSboxSchedule and SboxSchedule set up the S-box schedule 
from the 64-bit standard key (8-character key). The routine InitialSboxSchedule 
must be called first before calling SboxSchedule. EnKhufu or DeKhufu is called 
after routine SboxSchedule. 
The routine EnKhufu encrypts a 64-bit block with the supplied S-box schedule. 
The routine DeKhufu deciypts a 64-bit block with the supplied S-box schedule. 
Round is the number of rounds to encrypt or decrypt the data block and it must be a 
multiple of 8. The maximum number is 32. 
SEE ALSO 
des(3c), feal(3c), loki(3c), khafre(3c). 
khafre(l) 
NAME 
khafre - KHAFRE encryption algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
khafre [[-el-d] -k key -mode -r round -f file I -t] 
DESCRIPTION 
KHAFRE is symmetric block encryption algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to 
produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. Decryption is done by using 
the same key as for encryption. KHAFRE operates with four modes: electronic 
code book (ecb), cipher block chaining (cbc), cipher feedback (cfb), and output 
feedback (obf). The cbc mode is the default mode and it is recommended for 
encryption for increased security. The cfb and ofb modes have the same level of 
security with cbc mode, but the running time is a bit slower. 
The standard version of KHAFRE run with 8 rounds and 64-bit key. The number 
of rounds must be a multiple of 8. The extensions to KHAFRE have been 
implemented with this version. The number of rounds has been increased to 32. 
Options: 
-e encryption; the default is enctyption; 
-d deciyption; 
-k user-supplied key; if the key is not supplied with the command line, user will be 
asked for the key interactively; the minimum number of characters for the key is 5; 
-m mode, valid modes are ecb, cbc, cfb, ofb; cipher block chaining is the default 
mode of operation; 
-r round, the number of rounds used in enciphering or deciphering a block of data, 
valid values from 8 to 32 rounds. The more number of rounds of the enciphering, 
the higher security of the cipher data; the default value is 8; 
-f input file, if this option is used, the resulting encryption file will be written to the 
same name with an extension .e; 
-t time trial testing for algorithm running speed. 
Since the key is an argument to the khafre command, it is potentially visible to 
users executing ps(l) or a derivative. It is advisable to let the khafre command 
prompt for the key and enter it interactively. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher block chaining with 8 rounds, and fredl2345 
as the key: 
khafre-kfredl2345 -ffoo 
2. To decrypt the file foo.e 
khafre -d -kfredl2345 -f foo.e 
3. To encrypt a file foo, using cipher feedback mode (cfb) with 32 rounds: 
khafre -m cfb -r 32 -f foo 
4. To decrypt the file foo.e: 
khafre -d -m cfb -r 32 foo.e 
5. To encrypt a file foo, and the encrypted output is sent to file fool: 
khafre < foo > fool 
6. To time trial test KHAFRE with mode cbc and 32 rounds 
khafre -t -m cbc -r 32 
WARNING 
If two or more files encrypted with the same key are concatenated and an attempt is 
made to decrypt the result, only the first of original files is decrypted correctly. 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, loki, khufu, sbh, dbh, md4, md4x, md5, and haval. 
AUTHORS The algorithm was designed by R.C.Merkle, Xerox PARC. 
khafre(3c) 
NAME 
EnKhafre, DeKhafre - encrypt and decrypt a Khufu data block 
KhafreSboxSchedule - get Khafre standard s-box schedule 
SYNOPSIS 
EnKhafre(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long Sbox[4][256], unsigned long 
key[2] [2], int round) 
DeKhafre(unsigned long block[2], unsigned long Sbox[4][256], unsigned long 
key[2] [2], int round) 
KhafreSboxScheduleSchedule(unsigned long Sbox[4][256]) 
DESCRIPTION 
The C routines - EnKhafre, DeKhafre, KhafreSboxSchedule - provide low level 
access to the Khafre Encryption algorithm. 
Khafre is symmetric block encryption algorithm acting on 64 bits of plaintext to 
produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64 bit key. Decryption is done by using 
the same key as for encryption. 
The routine KhafreSboxSchedule must be called first, before any attempt to call 
EnKhafre and DeKhafre. 
The routine EnKhafre encrypts a 64-bit block with the supplied key. 
The routine DeKhafre decrypts a 64-bit block with the supplied key. 
Round is the number of rounds to encrypt or decrypt the data block and it must be a 
multiple of 8. The maximum number is 32. 
SEE ALSO 
des(3c), feal(3c), loki(3c), khufu(3c). 
sbh(l) 
NAME 
sbh - Single Block Hashing Algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
sbh -f file I -s string -a algorithm -k key -m mode -r round -F Format 
DESCRIPTION 
sbh is a 64-bit hashing algorithm which uses 64-bit symmetric block encryption 
algorithms - des, feal, loki, khufu, or khafre - to produce a 64-bit hashing message 
serving a tlngeiprint of a string or a file. 
The algorithm makes use of three modes - cipher chaining mode (cbc), single block 
hash (sbh) - to produce the hashing message. 
The basic algorithm (des, feal, loki, khufu, and khafre) can be selected through the 
use of option -a. 
Options: 
-f input file for hashing; 
-s input string for hashing; 
-a algorithm for hashing, the valid algorithms are des, feal, loki, khufu, and khafre; 
the default is des; 
-k key for the basic algorithm; the minimum number of characters for the key is 5; 
-m mode, the valid modes are cbc, sbh, the default is sbh; 
-r round, number of rounds for the basic algorithm, default is 8, the maximum 
value is 32; 
-F user-supplied fomiat. 
The output hashing message can be printed according to the user-supplied format. 
Any characters in the format not followed the character % will be printed without 
change; otherwise options will be substituted according to the rule as follows: 
h message hashing 
a algorithm used for hashing 
r number of rounds used for hashing 
m mode used for hashing 
n print a new line character 
t print a tab character 
% print the % character 
The hashing message is printed in hexadecimal format. 
Since the key is an argument to the smh command, it is potentially visible to users 
executing ps(l) or a derivative. It is advisable to let the smh command prompt for 
the key and enter it interactively. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To produce the hashing message for file foo, using algorithm des, 8 rounds, 
sbh -f foo 
or 
sbh < foo 
2. To produce the hashing message for string "encryption algorithm", using algorithm feal, 32 rounds, cipher block chaining. 
sbh -s"encryption algorithm" -a feal -r 32 -m cbc 
3. To produce the hashing message for file foo, using algorithm khufu and print with the user-supplied format. 
sbh -f foo -a khufu -F"File: foo. Hashing message: %h" 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, loki, khufu, khafre, dbh, md4, md4x, md5, and haval. 
AUTHORS 
The algorithm was proposed by L.Brown., J.Pieprzyk, and J.Seberry, University 
of New South Wales. See des, feal, loki, khufu, and khafre. 
dbh(l) 
NAME 
dbh - Double Block Hashing Algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
dbh -f file I -s string -a algorithm -kkey -m mode -r round -F Format 
DESCRIPTION 
dbh is a 128-bit hashing algorithm which uses 64-bit symmetric block encryption 
algorithms - des, feal, loki, khufu, or khafre - to produce a 128-bit hashing 
message serving a fingerprint of a string or a file. 
The basic algorithm (des, feal, loki, khufu, and khafre) can be selected through the 
use of option -a. 
Options: 
-f input file for hashing; 
-s input string for hashing; 
-a algorithm for hashing, the valid algorithms are des, feal, loki, khufu, and khafre; 
the default is des; 
-k key for the basic algorithm; the minimum number of characters for the key is 5; 
-r round, number of rounds for the basic algorithm, default is 8, the maximum 
value is 32; 
-F user-supplied format. 
The output message hashing can be printed according to the user-supplied format. 
Any characters in the format not followed the character % will be printed without 
change; otherwise options will be substituted according to the mle as follows: 
h message hashing 
a algorithm used for hashing 
r number of rounds used for hashing 
n print a new line character 
t print a tab character 
% print the % character 
The hashing message is printed in hexadecimal foraiat. 
Since the key is an argument to the dbh command, it is potentially visible to users 
executing ps(l) or a derivative. It is advisable to let the dbh command prompt for 
the key and enter it interactively. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To produce the hashing message for file foo, using algorithm des, 8 rounds, 
dbh - f foo 
or 
dbh < foo 
2. To produce the hashing message for string "encryption algorithm", using algorithm feal, 32 rounds. 
dbh -s"encryption algorithm" -a feal -r 32 
3. To produce the hashing message for file foo, using algorithm khufu and print with the user-suppHed fonnat. 
dbh -f foo -a khufu -F"File: foo. Hashing message: %h" 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, loki, khufu, khafre, sbh, md4, md4x, md5, and haval. 
AUTHORS 
The algorithm was proposed by J.J.Quisquater and M.Girault; Phillips Research 
Laboratory. The variant of the original algorithm, by L.Brown, J.Pieprzyk, and 
J.Seberry; University of New South Wales, is implemented for this command. See 
also des, feal, loki, khufu, and khafre. 
md4(l) 
NAME 
md4 - MD4 message digest algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
md4 -f file I -s string I -t -F Format 
DESCRIPTION 
MD4 is a message digest algorithm which takes input message (or file) of arbitrary 
length and produces an output 128-bit "fingerprint" or "message digest", in such a 
way that it is computationally infeasible to produce two message digests, or to 
produce any message having a given prespecified target message digest. 
Options: 
-f input file for hashing; 
-s input string for hashing; 
-t time trial testing; 
-F user-supplied forniat. 
The output message hashing can be printed according to the user-supplied format. 
Any characters in the format not followed the character % will be printed without 
change; otherwise options will be substituted according to the rule as follows: 
h message hashing 
a algorithm name (md4) 
n print a new line character 
t print a tab character 
% print the % character 
The hashing message is printed as two long words in hexadecimal format. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To produce the message digest for file foo. 
md4 -f foo 
or 
md4 < foo 
2. To produce a message digest for string "encryption algorithm". 
md4 -s"encryption algorithm" 
3. To produce the hashing message for file foo and print with the user-supplied format. 
md4 -f foo -F'Tile: foo, Hashing message: %h" 
4. To time trial test for the algorithm 
md4-t 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, loki, khufu, khafre, sbh, dbh, md4x, md5, and haval 
AUTHORS 
The algorithm was designed by R.L.Rivest, Laboratory for Computer Science, MIT. 
md4x(l) 
NAME 
md4x - MD4 message digest algorithm (extended version) 
SYNOPSIS md4x -f file I -s string I -t -F Fonnat 
DESCRIPTION 
MD4X is the extended version of the message digest algorithm MD4, which takes 
input message (or file) of arbitrary length and produces an output 256-bit 
"fingeiprint" or "message digest", in such a way that it is computationally infeasible 
to produce two message digests, or to produce any message having a given 
prespecified target message digest. 
Options: 
-f input file for hashing; 
-s input string for hashing; 
-t time trial testing; 
-F user-supplied fonnat. 
The output message hashing can be printed according to the user-supplied format. 
Any characters in the format not followed the character % will be printed without 
change; otherwise options will be substituted according to the rule as follows: 
h message hashing 
a algorithm name (md4x) 
n print a new Une character 
t print a tab character 
% print the % character 
The hashing message is printed as two long words in hexadecimal format. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To produce the message digest for file foo. 
md4x -f foo 
or 
md4x < foo 
2. To produce a message digest for string "encryption algorithm". 
md4x -s"enci7ption algorithm" 
3. To produce the hashing message for file foo and print with the user-supplied 
format. 
md4x -f foo -F'Tile: foo. Hashing message: %h" 
4. To time tiial test for the algorithm 
md4x -t 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, loki, khufu, khafre, sbh, dbh, md4, md5, and haval 
AUTHORS TJ^^ algorithm was designed by R.L.Rivest, Laboratory for Computer Science, 
md5(l) 
NAME 
md5 - MD5 message digest algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
md5 -f file I -s string I -t -F Fomiat 
DESCRIPTION 
MD5 is the revised version of the message digest algorithm MD4, which takes 
input message (or file) of arbitrary length and produces an output 128-bit 
"fmgeiprint" or "message digest", in such a way that it is computationally infeasible 
to produce two message digests, or to produce any message having a given 
prespecitled target message digest. 
Options: 
-f input file for hashing; 
-s input string for hashing; 
-t time trial testing; 
-F user-supplied fomiat. 
The output message hashing can be printed according to the user-supplied format. 
Any characters in the format not followed the character % will be printed without 
change; otherwise options will be substituted according to the rule as follows: 
h message hashing 
a algorithm name (md5) 
n print a new line character 
t print a tab character 
% print the % chai'acter 
The hashing message is printed as two long words in hexadecimal format. 
EXAMPLES 
1. To produce the message digest for file foo. 
md5 -f foo 
or 
md5 < foo 
2. To produce a message digest for string "encryption algorithm". 
md5 -s"encryption algorithm" 
3. To produce the hashing message for file foo and print with the user-supplied 
format. 
md5 -f foo -F'Tile: foo. Hashing message: %h" 
4. To time trial test for the algorithm 
md5 -t 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, loki, khufu, khafre, sbh, dbh, md4, md4x, and haval. 
AUTHORS algorithm was designed by R.L.Rivest, Laboratory for Computer Science, 
haval(l) 
NAME 
haval - HA VAL hashing algorithm 
SYNOPSIS 
haval -f file I -s string I -t -p pass -d digestjength -F Foniiat 
DESCRIPTION 
HAVAL is a one-way hashing algorithm with variable length of output. It is a 
detei-ministic algorithm which compresses an arbitrary long message (or a file) into 
a value of specified length. It is conjectured that it computationally infeasible to find 
two distinct messages that have the same digest. The output length of the HAVAL 
is a variable, which is 128, 160, 192, 224, or 256 bits, and is specified with option 
-d. HAVAL has a parameter (option -p) to control the number of passes (2, 3, or 4) 
to process the message digest. The higher is the number of passes the more security 
is the output hashing message. 
Combining output length with pass, HAVAL obtains fifteen (15) choices for 
practical applications where different levels of security required. 
Options: 
-f input file for hashing; 
-s input string for hashing; 
-t time trial testing; 
-p the number of pass to process; the valid values are 2, 3, and 4; the default value 
is 2 
-d required output length of digest message in bits; the valid values are 128, 160, 
192, 224, and 256; the default value is 128; 
-F user-supplied fomiat. 
The output message hashing can be printed according to the user-supplied format. 
Any characters in the format not followed the character % will be printed without 
change; otherwise options will be substituted according to the rule as follows: 
h message hashing 
a algoritlim name (haval) 
p number of passes 
d digest length 
n print a new line character 
t print a tab character 
% print the % character 
The hashing message is printed as two long words in hexadecimal format 
EXAMPLES 
1. To produce the 128-bit message digest for file foo. 
haval -f foo 
or 
haval < foo 
2. To produce a 128-bit message digest for suing "encryption algorithm", 
haval -s"enci7ption algorithm" 
3. To produce the 128-bit hashing message for file foo and print with the user-
supplied foiTnat. 
haval -f foo -F"File: foo. Hashing message: %h" 
4. To produce the 192-bit hashing message for string "haval", using 4 passes to 
process. 
haval -s"havar' -p4 -dl92 
5. To produce the 256-bit hashing message for string "haval", using 3 passes to 
process and print with the user-supplied forniat. 
haval -s"haval" -p3 -d256 -F'String: haval, %a%h%p%d" 
6. To time trial test for the algorithm 
haval -t 
SEE ALSO 
des, feal, loki, khufu, khafre, sbh, dbh, md4, md4x, and md5. 
AUTHORS 
The algorithm was designed by Y.Zheng, CenU-e for Computer Security Research, 
Department of Computer Science, University of Wollongong. 
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Appendix 
C Program listings 
1. main.c - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives 
2. des.c - data encryption standard 
3. feal.c - fest encryption algorithm 
4. loki.c - loki encryption algorithm 
5. khufii.c - khufu encryption algorithm 
6. khafre.c - khafre encryption algorithm 
7. sbhx - single block hashing algorithm 
8. dbh.c - double block hashing algorithm 
9. md4.c - message digest algorithm MD4 
10. md4x.c - message digest algorithm MD4 (extended version) 
11. mdS.c - message digest algorithm MD5 
12. haval.c - one-way hashing algorithm with variable length output 
mainx - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives Al 
/* 
** Routine : maiiLC 
** Main routine for 64-bit block cipher symmetric algorithms -




#define ECB 0 /* Electronic code book •/ 
#define CBC 1 /* Cipher block chaining »/ 
#define CFB 2 /* Cipher feedback */ 
#define CFB 3 /* Output feedback »/ 
typedef unsigned long Lon^, 
/» 
** Function prototypes: 
** Feal encryption algorithm 
»/ 
#if FEAL 
void Feal GetKeyScheduleO, EnFealQ, DeFealQ; 
#endif 
/ • 
** Des encryption standard algorithm 
»/ 
#ifDES 
void EnDesO, DeDesQ, Des_GetKeyScheduleO; 
#endif 
/ * 
*» Loki enciyption standard algorithm 
•/ 
#ifLOKI 
void EnLokiQ, DeLokiQ, Loki_GetKeyScheduleO; 
#endif 
/ • 
** Khufii encryption algorithm 
•/ 
#if KHUFU 
void InitialSboxScheduleO, SboxScheduleQ, EnKhufuQ, DeKhufuQ; 
#endif 
/* 
Khafre encryption algorithm 
*/ 
#if KHAFRE 
void KhafreSboxScheduleO, EnKhafreQ, DeKhafreQ; 
#endif 
/* 
General encryption, decryption, and time trial test routines 
*/ 
void Do_Encrypt(), Do_DecryptO, TimeTrialTestQ; 
/* 
** Global variables: 
** Initial vector, command name, 
»* and default input, ou^ut file pointers 
*/ 











main.c - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A2 
int c,eflag,tflag,d£lag^ag^ag^ag4(iIag,eiTilag; 
extern char *opftarg; 
charfiiename[160]; 
int mode = CBC; 
int round = 8; 
diar tkey[20],ncey=tkey; 
longtimel,time2; 
** Option processing 
tflag==dflag==eflag==TÍlag==fflag==mflag=kflag===OTf[ag= 0; 
cmdname = argv[0]; 
wiiile ((c=getopt(argc,argv,"edf:k:r:m:t")) != EOF) { 
switch (c) { 




case T: flQag-H-; 
strcpy(filename,optarg); 
break; 
case Tc': kflag-H-; 
key = optarg; 
break; 
case f: tflag++; 
break; 
case'm': if ((strcmp(optarg,"ecb")) && (strcmp(optarg,"cbc")) && 




if (!strcmp(optarg,"ecb")) mode = ECB; 
if (!strcmp(optarg,"cbc")) mode = CBC; 
if (!strcmp(optarg,"cfb")) mode = CFB; 
if (!strcmp(optarg,"ofb")) mode = OFB; 
} 
break; 
case V: if (((round = atoi(optarg)) = 0) || 











if (!kflag) { 
while ((key = (char *)getpass("Key: ")) == (char *)0) { 
)̂riirtf(stderr,"%s: invalid password!\n"); 
} 
} 
else if (strlen(key) < 5) { 




if (errflag) { 
§MTntfl:stderr,"\nUsage: %s [ [ -e | -d ] -k key cmdname); 





TimeTrialT0it(mode, key, round); 
time(&time2); 
QHÍnt̂ stdout,"Real time to encrypt 100-Kb block: %d", time2-timel); 
mainx - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A3 
switdi(mode) { 
case ECB: Q>Aitf(stdoiit,'' - mode(ECB)"); break; 
case CBC: Qwint^stdout," - modeCCBC)"); break; 
case CFB: ^)riiiitfl:stdoiit," - niode(CFB)"); break; 
case OFB: Q)riiitf(stdout," - mode(OFB)"); break; 
} 




if ((i5)i = fopen(filenaine, V)) = NULL) { 
^wînt^stderr,"Couldnt <q)en iiq>ut fUe %s!\n", filename); 
exit(l); 
} 
if (!strcnq)(iilaiame + strlen(iilename) - 2, ".e")) 
•(filename + strlen(filename) - 2) = ̂ 0'; 
else strcat(filename,".e"); 
if ((iÇx) = fopen(filename, "w")) = NULL) { 














Do_EncryptO : encrypt a file with a mode, key schedule, 





int round; { 
inti, cnt=0; 
Long woric[2]; 





** feal: default key initialisation (128 bits) 
for (i=0;i < 16;i++) ekey[i] = 0; 
if(strlen(key)>16) 
*(key+16) = W; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i++) 
ekey[i]=key[i]; 
/* 








** des: defauh key initialisation (64 bits) 
for (i=0;i < 8U-H-) dkey[i] = 0; 
if (strlen(key) > 8) 
main.c - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A4 
»(key + 8) = ^0'; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i++) 
dkey[i] = key[i]; 
/* 
** create key schedule for des 
»/ 






loki: default key initialisation (64 bits) 
for (i=0;i < 8;i-H-) lkey[i] = 0; 
if (strlen(key) > 8) 
*(key + 8) = W; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i++) 
lkey[i]=key[i]; 
** create key schedule for loki 
*/ 










Long »»Lkey = (Long »»)Tkey; 
Long StandardSBox[4][256]; 
/» 
** khafi-e: default key initialisation (128 bits) 
»/ 
for(i=0;i< 16;i++) 
Tkey[i] = i+ 11; 
if (strlen(key) > 16) 
•(key+16) = ^0'; 




work[0] = work[l] = OL; 
switch (mode) { 
case ECB: /• Electronic Code Book mode */ 
do{ 
if ((cnt = fread((char •)work, 1, 8, fpi)) != 8) 






#ifLOKI EnLoki(work,loki_keyschedule,round); #endif 
mainx - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A5 
#ifKHUFU 
&iKhiifii(woik, Sbo?̂  mind); 
#eiidtf 
#ifKHAFRE 
EiiKbafre(wotk, StandardSBox, Lkey,TY)und); 
#eiidif 
fwrite((char *)wofk, 1,8, 
>vrfnle(ait = 8); 
break; 
caseCBC: /* Cipher Block Chaining mode */ 
do{ 
if ((cnt = fread((diar •)wotk, 1,8, ̂ i)) != 8) 








#ifLOKI &iLoki(w«k,l(̂ _keysdiedule,round); #endif 
#ifKHUFU 
&iKhufù(work, Sbox, round); 
#endif 
#ifKHAFRE 
&iKhafie(woik, StandardSBox, Lkeŷ round); 
#endif 
ivIO] = workIO]; 
iv[l] = woik[l]; 
fvvrite((char *)work, 1, 8, 
} v»4ile (ait = 8); 
break; 
<ase CFB: /* 8-bit CijAer FeedBadc mode */ 
do{ 
if ((cnt = fiead((char »)&charl, 1,1, fpt)) = 1) { 
#ifFEAL BiFeal(iv/eal_keysdiedule,round); 
^̂endif 




EnKhufu(iv, Sbox, round); 
#endif 
#ifKHAFRE 
EnKhafie(iv, StandardSBox, Lkey,round); 
#endif 
main.c - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A6 
charl *cptr, 
ftmte((char »)&charl, 1,1, 
for(i=0;i<7;i++) 
»(cptr + i) = »(cptr + i + l ) ; 
»(cptr + 7) = charl; 
} 
} while (cnt == 1); 
break; 
case OFB: /* 8-bit Output FeedBack mode •/ 
do{ 










EnKhufu(iv, Sbox, round); 
#endif 
#ifKHAFRE 
EnKhafre(iv, StandardSBox, Ucey,round); 
#endif 
charl ^ *cptr, char2 = *cptr, 
f\vrite((char •)&charl, 1,1, fpo); 
for(i=0;i<7;i++) 
*(cptr + i) = »(cptr + i + 1); 
•(cptr + 7) = char2; 
> 





** Do_Deci7ptO : decrypt a file with a mode, key schedule, 















** feal: default key initialisation 
for (i=0;i < 16;i++) ekey[i] = 0; 
main.c - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A7 
if(stikfi(k^)>16) 
•(key+16) = 'V0'; 
for (i=OU < slrleii(key);t++) 
ekey{i] =key(i]; 
I* 







/» ** des: default key initialisatioD (64 bits) 
for (i=0,i < 8p++) dkQr[i] = 0; 
if(strlei](key)>8) 
•(key + 8) = 'V0'; 
for (i=0-4 < striai(key);i++) 
dkey[il = keyti]; 
I* 
** ideate k ^ sdiedule for des 
*! 





!* ** loki: default key initialisatioo (64 bits) 
for (i=0,i < 8U-I-+) Ikeypl = 0; 
if(strieii(key)>8) 
*(key + 8) = 'V0'; 
for (i=0,i < strleii(key);i++) 
lkey(i]=key(i]; 
/» 
** CTeate k ^ sdiedule for 
•/ 










Long ••Lkey = (Long •*)Tkey; 
Long StandardSBox[41[256]; 
I* 
** khafie: defeult key initialisation (128 bits) 
for (i=oa< 16-4++) 
TkeyH = i + l l ; 
if(strlen(key)> 16) 
•(key+16) = Vn 
for Ci=OU < strlen(keyXt++) 
Tkeylil = kcy[il; 
main.c - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A8 
KhafreSboxSchedule(StandardSBox); 
#endif 
work[0] = wofk[l] = 0L; 
switch (mode) { 
caseECB: /* Electronic Code Book mode •/ 














prev[0] = work[0]; prev[l] = woik[l]; 
if ((cnt = fread((char •)work,l,8,Q)i)) != 8) { 
cnt = ((char •)prev)[7]; 
i f (cnt<0| |cnt>7){ 
Ò)rintf(stdeiT,"%s: Corrupted ciphertextW, cmdname); 
exit(-l); 
} 
else if (cnt >0) 
fwrite((char •)prev,l,cnt,fix)); 
} 
else fVvrite((char •)prev, 1, 8, 
} while (cnt = 8); 
break; 
caseCBC: /» Cipher Block Chaining mode */ 
cnt = fread((char »)work,l,8^i); 
do{ 












woik[0] iv[0]; work[l] ^ iv[l]; 
iv[0] = nextiv[0]; iv[l] = nextiv[l]; 
prev[0] = woric[0]; prev[l] = work[l]; 
mainx - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A9 
if ((cot = fread((char *)work,l,8̂ i)) != 8) { 
ait = ((char •)prev)[7]; 
if(ciit<0||ait>7){ 






else fwrite((char *)iM'ev, 1, 8, 
>while((ait = 8); 
break; 
case CFB: /• 8-bit Cipher FeedBack mode *! 
do{ 









EiiKhuiu(iv, Sbox, round); 
#endif 
#ifKHAFRE 
&iKhafre(iv, StandardSBox, Lkeŷ ound); 
#endif 
char2 = charl; charl *cptr, 
fwrite((char *)&charl, 1,1, fpo); 
fOT(i=0,i<7;i-H-) 
•(cptr + i) = »(cptr + i + l); 
•(cptr + 7) = diar2; 
} 
} while (cnt =1); 
break; 
case OFB: I* 8-bit Ou^ FeedBadc mode *! 
do{ if ((cat = fread((char •)&charl, 1,1, fpi)) = 1) { 
#ifFEAL EnFeal(iv/eal_keyschedulê nd); 
#endif 
#ifDES BiDes(iv,des_keyschedule,round); #eiidif 
#ifLOKI QiL<dd(iv,l<Jd_keyschedulê ound); 
#endif 
#ifKHUFU 
&iKhufii(iv, Sbox, round); 
#eDdif 
#ifKHAFRE 
]&iKhafre(iv, StandardSBox, Lkey,round); 
#endif 
charl *cptr. 
mainx - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives AlO 
fwrite((cliar •)&cliarl, 1,1. 
diai2 = *qjtr, 
for(i=0,i<7U++) 
•(qitr + i) = *(qjtr + i + 1); 
•(qjtr + 7) = diar2; 
> 





** TimeTrialTestO : encryption test of a file with a mode, key sdiedule, 





i n t r c H i n d ; 
{ 
int i, j, k, ait=0; 
Longwoik[2]; 





** feal: defauh key initialisation (128 bits) 
*/ 
for (i=0;i < 16;i++) ekey[i] = 0; 
i f ( s t r l e n ( k e y ) > 1 6 ) 
• ( k e y + 1 6 ) = ' \0 ' ; 
f o r ( i=0-4 < s i r l e n ( k e y ) ; i + + ) 
e k e y [ i ] = k e y t i ] ; 
I* 
** o ^ e key sdiedule fw feal 
*/ 
F e a I _ G e t K e y S d i e d u l e ( d c e y / e a l _ k e y s d i e d u I e , i o u n d ) ; 





** des: default key initialisati<m (64 bits) 
*/ for (i=0;i < 8U++) dkey[i] = 0; 
if(strlen(key)>8) 
•(key+ 8) = "NO*; 
for (i=OU < strlen(key)-4++) 
dkey[i]=key[i]; 
I* 
** oeate key sdiedule f ^ des 
*/ 
I > e s _ G e t K Q « d i e d u l e ( d k e y , d e s _ k e y s d i e d u l e , FOUIKI); 





** default key initialisaticm (64 bits) 
for (i=OU < 8U++) Dcfiyii] = 0; 
mam.c - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives Al 1 
if(strleti(key)>8) 
for (i=0,i < strieii(key);i++) 
lkey[i] = key[il; 
I* 
** create key sdiedule for 
•/ 










Long •*Lkey = (Long ••)Tkey; 
Long StandaidSBox[4][2S6]; 
I* 
** khafie: default key initialisation (12S bits) 
»/ 
for(i=0,i<16;i-H-) 
Tkey[i] = i+ll; 
if(strien(key)>16) 
•(key+16) = %0'; 




work[0]=work[l] = 0U 
switdi (mode) { 











EnKhufii(woik, Sbox, round); 
#endif 
#ifKHAFRE 
EnKhafre(wofk, StandardSBox, Lkey,round); 
#endif } 
break; 














EnKhufu(woTk, Sbox, round); 
#endif 
#ifKHAFRE 
EnKhafre(work, StandardSBox, Lkey^ound); 
#endif 
iv[0] = work[0]; 
iv[l] = woric[l]; 
} 
break; 
case CFB: /• 8-bit Cipher FeedBack mode »/ 











EiiKhufu(iv, Sbox, round); 
#endif 
#ifKHAFRE 




•(cptr + i) = »(cptr + i+ 1); 
















EnKhufu(iv, Sbox, round); 
#endif 
main.c - main routine for 64-bit cryptographic primitives A13 
#ifKHAFRE 
EnKhafre(iv, StandardSBox, Lkey^ound); 
#endif 
charl ^ *q)tr, char2 = *q)tr, 
for(i=0;i<7;i++) 
•(cptr + i) = *(cptr + i + 1); 







End of main.c 
des.c - data encryption standard Al4 
** Include file: des.h 




#define MASK28 OxFFFFFFFOL 




28-bit left rotation 
*/ 
#define RotLeft28(b,pos) (b = ((b « pos) | (b » (28 - pos))) & MASK28) 
/» 
** Initial Permutation 
•/ 
chardesJP(64] = { 
58, 50,42,34,26,18,10, 2, 
60, 52,44,36,28,20,12, 4, 
62, 54,46,38.30,22, 14, 6, 
64, 56, 48,40,32,24,16, 8, 
57,49,41,33,25, 17, 9, 1, 
59,51,43,35,27, 19, 11, 3, 
61,53,45,37,29,21,13, 5, 
63,55,47,39,31,23, 15, 7}; 
/* 
** Final Permutation 
*/ 
chardes_FP[64] = { 
40, 8,48, 16, 56,24,64,32, 
39, 7,47, 15,55,23,63,31, 
38, 6,46,14, 54,22,62,30, 
37, 5,45,13,53,21,61,29, 
36, 4,44, 12, 52,20,60,28, 
35, 3,43, 11,51, 19,59,27, 
34, 2,42,10, 50,18, 58,26, 




chardes_E[64] = { 
32, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,33,34, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,33,34, 
8, 9, 10,11,12,13,33,34, 
12,13, 14,15,16,17,33,34, 





»• Permuted Choice 1 
*/ 
chardes_PCl[64] = { 
57,49,41,33,25,17, 9, 
1, 58, 50,42,34,26,18, 
10, 2,59,51,43,35,27, 
19, 11, 3,60,52,44,36, 
8,16, 24,32, 
63, 55,47,39,31,23, 15, 
7,62, 54,46,38,30,22, 
14, 6,61, 53,45,37,29, 
21,13, 5,28,20,12, 4, 
40,48, 56,64}; 
/• 
Permuted Choice 2 
•/ 
chardes_PC2[64] = { 
des.c - data encryption standard A15 
14,17, 11,24, 1, 5,29,29, 
3,28,15, 6,21,10,30,30, 
23,19,12, 4,26, 8,31,31, 
16, 7,27,20, 13, 2,32,32, 
44,56,35,41,51,59,61,61, 
34,44, 55,49,37,52,62,62, 
48, 53,43,60,38, 57,63,63, 
50,46, 54,40,33,36,64,64,}; 
/ • 
** Key Rotation Schedule 
»/ 
chardes_keyrot[161 = { 1,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,1,2,2,2,2,2,2,1 }; 
/• S-boxes 
•/ 
chardes_S[8][641 = { 
«SI 
14, 4, 13, 1, 2,15,11, 8, 3,10, 6,12, 5, 9, 0, 7, 
0,15, 7, 4,14, 2,13, 1,10, 6,12,11, 9, 5, 3, 8, 
4, 1, 14, 8, 13, 6, 2,11, 15,12, 9, 7, 3, 10, 5, 0, 




15, 1, 8,14, 6,11, 3, 4, 9, 7, 2,13,12, 0, 5,10, 
3,13, 4, 7,15, 2, 8,14,12, 0, 1,10, 6, 9,11, 5, 
0,14, 7,11,10, 4,13, 1, 5, 8,12, 6, 9, 3, 2,15, 




10, 0, 9,14, 6, 3,15, 5, 1,13,12, 7,11, 4, 2, 8, 
13, 7, 0, 9, 3, 4, 6,10, 2, 8, 5,14,12,11,15, 1, 
13, 6, 4, 9, 8,15, 3, 0,11, 1, 2,12, 5,10,14, 7, 




7.13.14, 3, 0, 6, 9,10, 1, 2, 8, 5,11,12, 4,15, 
13, 8,11, 5, 6,15, 0, 3, 4, 7, 2,12, 1,10,14, 9, 
10, 6, 9, 0,12,11, 7,13,15, 1, 3,14, 5, 2, 8, 4, 




2,12, 4, 1, 7,10,11, 6, 8, 5, 3,15,13, 0,14, 9, 
14,11, 2,12, 4, 7,13, 1, 5, 0,15,10, 3, 9, 8, 6, 
4, 2, 1,11,10,13, 7, 8,15, 9,12, 5, 6, 3, 0,14, 




12, 1,10,15, 9, 2, 6, 8, 0,13, 3, 4,14, 7, 5,11, 
10,15, 4, 2, 7,12, 9, 5, 6, 1,13,14, 0,11, 3, 8, 
9.14.15, 5, 2, 8,12, 3, 7, 0, 4,10, 1,13,11, 6, 




4,11, 2,14,15, 0, 8,13, 3,12, 9, 7, 5,10, 6, 1, 
13, 0,11, 7, 4, 9, 1,10,14, 3, 5,12, 2,15, 8, 6, 
1, 4,11,13,12, 3, 7,14,10,15, 6, 8, 0, 5, 9, 2, 




13, 2, 8, 4, 6,15, 11, 1,10, 9, 3,14, 5, 0,12, 7, 
1,15,13, 8,10, 3, 7, 4,12, 5, 6,11, 0,14, 9, 2, 
7,11, 4, 1, 9,12,14, 2, 0, 6,10,13,15, 3, 5, 8, 
2, 1,14, 7, 4,10, 8,13,15,12, 9, 0, 3, 5, 6,11}; 
des.c - data encryption standard A16 
•• 32-bit Permutation 






32,27, 3, 9, 
19,13,30, 6, 
22,11, 4, 25}; 
typedef unsigned long Lon^, 
/* 













des.c - data encryption standard A17 
I* 
I* 
** Routine: des.c (Data Encryption Standard) 
(Some code has been inspired by Lawrence Brown, Computer Science Dept. 
UC, UNSW, Canberra, ACT 2600). 





EnDes() : encrypt a 64-bit DES block with a key schedule, 







Long Temp, woric[2]; 
register int i; 
Des_Perm64(work, b, desJP); 
for (i=0;i < round;i-H-) { 
Temp = woric[0] Des_F(work[l], des_keyschedule[i]); 
work[0] = work[l]; 
woric[l] = Temp; 
} 
Temp = woric[0]; 
work[0] = work[l]; 
work[l] = Temp; 
Des_Penn64(b, work, des_FP); 
} 
/• 
DeDesO : decrypt a 64-bit DES block with a key schedule, 







Long Temp, woric[2]; 
register int i; 
Des_Perm64(work, b, desJP); 
for (i=round-l;i >= 0; i - ) { 
Temp = woik;[0] Des_F(woric[l], des_keyschedule[i]); 
work[0] = woric[l]; 
woik[l] = Temp; 
} 
Temp = work[0]; 
woric[0] = work[l]; 
work[l] = Temp; 
Des_Perm64(b, work, des_FP); 
} 
/• 







des.c - data encryption standard A18 
Long b = OU out = OL; 
chara[8]; 
register Long s; 
register Long rc; 
register int j; 
Des_E}q)and(a, r); 
for(j=0j<8j-H-){ 
rc = a[j]'^kG]; 
rc » = 2; 
rc = (rc & 0x20) | ((rc « 4) & 0x10) | ((rc » 1) & OxOF); 
s = des_S[j][rc]; 
b = (b « 4) I s; 
> 











Long work[2], Lsp = (Long)out; 
woric[0] = in; 










Long workl [2],woric2[2]; 
Long »LKey = (Long *)key; 
inti; 
Des_Perm64(work2,LKey,des_PCl); 
work2[0] &= MASK28; 
work2[l] &= MASK28; 




des_keyschedule[i][0] = workl [0]; 










Long mask = DESBITl; 
register int i; 
des.c - data encryption standard A19 
•out = OL; 
for(i=l;i<=32;i-H-){ 
if (Des_Bit32(in,*perm++)) «out |= mask; 











Lwig mask = DESBITl; 
out[0] = out[l]=0L; 
for(i=l;i<=32; i-H-){ 
if (Des_Bit64(in,*perm-H-)) out[0] |= mask; 
m a s k » = 1; 
} 
mask = DESBm; 
for(i=l;i<=32; i++) { 
if (Des_Bit64{in,*penn-H-)) out[l] 1= mask; 









L<Migtmp = n; 
tmp « = (pos-1); 
if ((tmp & DESBITl) = DESBITl) return 1; 
else return 0; 
> 
/* 






if (pos > 32) return Des_Bit32(n[ll,pos-32); 
else return Des_Bit32(n[0],pos); 
} 
/ • 
** End of des.c ** 
feal.c - fast encryption algorithm A20 
/• 
** Routine: feal.c 
Fast encryption algorithm 
Compile: cc -o feal -DFEAL maiac feal.c 
••DzungLe-Oct,92 
#include <stdio.h> 
typedef unsigned long Long; 
#defme Feal_Roa(n) ((n « 2) | (n » 6)) 
#defme Feal_S(x,y,delta) (Feal_Rot2((char) (((int) x + y + delta) % 256))) 
I* 










** EnFealQ : encrypt a 64-bit FEAL block with a key schedule, 
and a number of rounds. 
•/ 
void EnFeal(woric4eal_keyschedule,round) 






** working keys at begining and end processing 
*! 
k89 = feal_keyschedule[(round / 2)]; 
kab = feal_keyschedule[(round / 2) + 1]; 
kcd = feal_keyschedule[(round / 2) + 2]; 
kef = feal_keyschedule[(round / 2) + 3]; 
work[0]^k89; 
workil j '^kab; 
L = work[0]; 
R^workni '^L; 
for (i=0;i < round;i++) { 
Temp = L; 
L = R; 
if(( i%2) = 0) 
R = Temp Feal_F(R, (feal_keyschedule[i / 2] » 16)); 
else 
R = Temp ^ Feal_F(R, (feal_keyschedule[i / 2] & OxFFFF)); 
} 
L ' ^ R ; 
R '^kcd ; 
L '^ke f i 
woric[0] = R; 
work[l] = L; 
} 
/ • 
DeFealO: decrypt a 64-bit FEAL block with a key schedule, and 
a number of rounds. 
•/ 
feal.c - fast encryption algorithm All 
void DeFeaI(work,feal_keyschedule^iKl) 







** working keys at begining and end processing 
•/ 
k89 = feal_keyschedule[(round / 2)]; 
kab = feal_keyschedulc[(round / 2) + 1]; 
kcd = feal_keyschcdule[(round / 2) + 2]; 
kef = feal_keyschedule[(round / 2) + 3]; 
wofkiOJ'^kcd; 
woik i l l ' ^kef , 
R = wotk[0]-, 
L = work[l]'^R; 
for (i=round-l;i >= 0;i-) { 
Temp = R; 
R = L; 
i f ( ( i%2)==0) 
L = Temp Feal_F(R, (feal_keyschedule[i / 2] » 16)); 
else 
L = Temp FeaI_F(R, (feal_keyschedule[i / 2] & OxFFFF)); 
} 
R ^ L ; 
L ' ^ k S g ; 
R ' ^ k a b ; 
work[0] = L; 
work[l] = R; 
> 
/» 






Long »LKey = (Long •)key, 
/» 
»» 64-bit left part of the key 
*l 
Long A = LKey[0], B = LKey[l]; 
/• 
** 64-bit right part of the key 
Long KRl = LKey[21, KR2 = LKey[21; 
Long D = (Long)0, QR = KRl KR2, Temp; 
for(i=0;i<64;i-H-) feal_keyschedule[il = (Long)0; 
for (i=0;i < (round » 2);i-H-) { 
i f ( i > 0 ) { 
D = A;A = B;B = Temp; 
} 
i f ( ( i%3) = 0) 
Temp = Feal_Fk( A, (B QR) D ); 
¡ f ( ( i % 3 ) — 1 ) 
feal.c - fast encryption algorithm A22 
Temp = Feal_Fk( A, (B KRl) D ); 
i f ( ( i%3)==2) 
Temp = Feal_Fk( A, (B KR2) ^ D ); 









charf0,f l , f2, f3, 
aO = (char) ((a » 24) & OxFF), 
al = (char) ((a » 16) & OxFF), 
a2 = (char) ((a » 8) & OxFF), 
a3 = (char) a & OxFF, 
bO = (char) ((b » 8) & OxFF), 
bl = (char) b & OxFF; 
Long retn=OL; 
fl = a l '^bO^aO; 
fl =Feal_S(fl,f2,1); 
f2 = Feal_S( f2, fl, 0); 
fD = Feal_S(a0,fl,0); 
O = Feal_S( a3, f2,1); 
retni=fO 
r e t n « = 
retn|=fl 
r e t n « = 
retn|=f2 













aO = (char) ((a » 24) & OxFF), 
al = (char) ((a » 16) & OxFF), 
a2 = (char) ((a » 8) & OxFF), 
a3 = (char)a&0xFF, 
bO = (char) ((b » 24) & OxFF), 
bl = (char) ((b » 16) & OxFF), 
b2 = (char) ((b » 8) & OxFF), 
b3 = (char) b & OxFF; 
Long retn=OL; 
f k l ^ a l ' ^ a O ; 
flc2 = a2'^a3; 
fkl = Feal_S( fkl , fk2 ̂  bO, 1); 
fk2 = Feal_S( fk2, fkl bl, 0); 
fkO = Feal_S( aO, fkl b2,0); 
fk3 = Feal_S(a3, fk2'^b3,1); 
retn |= fkO; 
retn « = 8; 
retn 1= fkl; 
feal.c - fast encryption algorithm A23 
retn « = 8; 
retn |= fk2; 
reta « = 8; 
retn |= fk3; 
return retn; 
> 
/* * * 
••Endoffealc 
*! 
loki.c - loki encryption algorithm A24 
•• Include file: loki.h 
Loki Encryption Algorithm 
Dzung Le - Oct, 92 
«« 
*/ 
#define LOKIBITl 0x80000000L 
#defineMASK28 OxFFFFFFFOL 
#defineErow 31 
#define ECB 0 
#define CBC 1 
#defineCFB 2 
#define OFB 3 
#define Loki_RotLeft(n,pos) ((n « pos) | (n » (32 - pos))) 
#define Loki_RotRight(n,pos) ((n « (32 - pos)) | (n » pos)) 
typedef unsigned long Long; 
/* 
** 
** Global variables 
*/ 
charloki_P[32] = { 
31,23, 15, 7,30,22, 14, 6, 
29,21, 13, 5,28,20,12, 4, 
27,19,11, 3,26,18,10, 2, 
25, 17, 9, 1,24,16, 8,0}; 
int loki_Sbox[16] - { 375,379,391,395,397,415,419,425, 
433,445,451,463,471,477,487,499}; 
/• 


















loki.c - loki encryption algorithm A25 
I* 
** Rmitine: lokix 
** Loki encryption algorithm 





#defineLoki_RotLeft(n,pos) ((n « pes) | (n » (32 - pes))) 
#defme Loki_RotRigbt(n,pos) ((n « (32 - pes)) | (n » pes)) 
I* 






Long L = work[0], R = work[l]. Temp; 
inti; 
for (i=0;i < round;i++) { 
Temp = L; 
L = R; 
R = Temp loki_F( R, loki_keyschedule[i]); 
woik[01 = L; 
woik[l] = R; 
} 
Temp = work[0]; 
work[0] = w<wk[l]; 
woric[l] = Taiq); 
> 







Long L = wotk[01, R = workll]. Temp; 
for (i=round-lU >= 0;i-) { 
Temp = L; 
L = R; 
R = Temp loki_F( R, loki_keyschedule[i]); 
work[01 = L; 
wotk[l] = R; 
} 
Temp = work[01; 
work[0]=work[l]; 
work[l] = Temp; 
} 
t* 






loki.c - loki encryption algorithm A26 





** loki_SO : loki S box. «* 
Longloki_S(e) 
int*e; { 
int i, row, col, tempi, temp2; 
Longretn=OL; 
f<M:(i=0;i<4;i++){ 
row = ((e[i] & 0x3) | ((e[i] » 8) & OxC)); 
col = ( (e[ i ]»2)&0xFF); 
tempi = (row* 17)'^OxFF; 
temp2 = (col + tempi) OxFF; 
reta 1= (Long) (temp2 & OxFF); 








int round; { 
Long KL = key[0], KR = key[l]; 
Long Temp; 
inti; 
for (i=0;i < round;i-H-) { 
i f (( i%2) = 0){/»even*/ 
loki_keyschedule[i] = KL; 
Temp = loki_keyschedule[i]; 
KL = Temp; 
Loki_RotLeft(KU 13); 
} 
else { /* even */ 
loki_keyschedule[i] = KL; 
Temp = ldd_keyschedule[i]; 
KL =KR; 





lcJd_j)erm320 : 32-bit permutation. «« •/ 
Lwig Ioki_perm32(in) 
Long in; { 
Long out, mask = LOKIBITl; 
register int i; 
diar *perm = l<dd_P; 
loki.c - loki encryption algorithm Ml 
out = OL; 
for(i=31;i>=0;i-){ 
if (Loki_Bit32(in,*perm++)) out |= mask; 





•• Loki_Expand(): «* 




•out = *(out +1) = *(out + 2) = »(out + 3) = 0; 
•out = (intX((in & OxFFOOOOOOL) » 24) | ((in & OxFL) « 8)); 
»(out + 1) = (intX(in & OxFFFOOOOL) » 16); 
•(out + 2) = (intX(in & OxFFFOOL) » 8); 
•(out + 3) = (intXin & OxFFFL); 
} 
/ • 




intpos;/^3130 .... 1 0 •/ 
{ 
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/• 
Routine: khufli.c 
Khufli encryption algorithm 




#defme RotRight(W, s) ((W » s) | (W « (32 - s))) 
#define RotLeft(W, s) ((W « s) | (W » (32 - s))) 
typedef unsigned long Long; 
f* 
** Rotate schedule 
int RotSchedule[8] = {16,16, 8,8,16,16,24,24}; 
/* 
** Initial auxialiaiy keys taken from the fraction of Pi 
*/ 






** EnKhufuQ: encrypt a 64-bit Khufu block with Sbox schedule 
•/ 
void EnKhufu(work, Sbox, round) 
Long 'woric, ••Sbox; 
int round; 
{ 
Long L, R, Temp; 
int i, octet; 
L = work[01; 
R = work[l]; 
L auxkey[0]; 
R aurfcey[l]; 
octet = 0; 
for (i=0;i < round;i-H-) { 
R Sbox[octet][(int)L & OxFF]; 
L = (Long) RotRight(URotSchedule[i % 8]); 
Temp = U 
L = R; 
R = Temp; 





work[0] = L; 
wotk[l] = R; 
} 
DeKhufiiO : decrypt a 64-bit Khufii blodc with Sbox schedule 
•/ 
void DeKhufu(work, Sbox, round) 
Long *wofk, ••Sbox; 
int round; 
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{ 
Long L, R, Temp; 
int i, octet; 
L = woik[0]; 
R = woric[l]; 
L auxkey[2]; 
R auxkey[3]; 
octet = round / 8; 
for (i=round-l;i >= 0;i-) { 
if(((i + l )%8)==0) 
octet-; 
R = (Long) RotLefl(R,RotSchedule[i % 8]); 
L Sbox[octet][(int)R & OxFF]; 
Temp = L; 
L = R; 




work[0] = L; 









in t i j ; 
I* 
** Initial S box 
for(i=0;i<4;i-H-){ 
for0'=0J<256j++){ 





•• SboxSchedule(): create the S box from the initial S box, 













•• initial vector for cipher block chaining 
*/ 
Long iv[2]; 
Initial S box 
•/ for(i=0;i<4;i++){ 
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for(j=Ou<256J++){ 





((char •)Lkey)[i] = i; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i++) 
((char»)Lkey)[i] = key[il; 
** Generate Sbox which is enough for 32 rounds, 
using EnKhufu routine, initial S box and the user-supplied key. 
Cipher block chaining mode, round = 32. 
•/ 
iv[0] = iv[l] = (Long)0; 
for(i=0;i<256;i++){ 
Lkey[0] ^ iv[0]; 
Lkey[l] iv[l]; 
EnKhufu(Lkey, InitialSbox, 32); 
iv[0] = Lkey[0]; 
iv[l] = Lkey[l]; 
Sbox[0][2«i ] = ((unsigned char •)Lkey)[0]; 
Sbox[l][2«i ] = ((unsigned char •)Lkey)[l]; 
Sbox[2][2«i ] = ((unsigned char »)Lkey)[2]; 
Sbox[3][2*i ] = ((unsigned char *)Lkey)[3]; 
Sbox[0][2«i + 128] = ((unsigned char •)Lkey)[4]; 
Sbox[l][2*i + 128] = ((unsigned char *)Lkey)[5]; 
Sbox[2][2*i + 128] = ((unsigned char •)Lkey)[6]; 
Sbox[3][2*i + 128] = ((unsigned char »)Lkey)[7]; 
} 
/ • 
** Reset the auxiliary keys 
*/ 
Lkey[0] iv[0]; 
Lkey[l] ^ ¡v[l]; 
EnKhufu(Lkey, Sbox, 32); 
auxkey[0] = ((unsigned char »)Lkey)[7]; 
auxkey[ll = ((unsigned char •)Lkey)[5]; 
auxkey[2] = ((unsigned char •)Lkey)[3]; 
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•• Routine: khafre.c 
Khafre encryption algorithm 
** Compile: cc -o khafre -DKHAFRE main.c khafre.c 
** Dzung Le • Oct, 92 
»/ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#define RotRight(W, s) ((W » s) | (W « (32 - s))) 
#defme RotLeft(W, s) ((W « s) | (W » (32 - s))) 
typedef unsigned long Long; 
/• 
** Rotate schedule 
*/ 






** EnKhafreO : encrypt a 64-bit Khafre block with t 
standard S box. 
»/ 
void EnKhafre(work, Sbox, key, round) 
Long work[2], Sbox[4][256], key[2](2]; 
int round; 
{ 
Long L, R, Tenq); 
int i, octet; 
int keysize=2, keyind; 
L = work[0]; 
R = work[l]; 
L^key[0][0]; 
R'^keyiOJil]; 
keyind = 0; 
octet = (round / 8); 
octet = 0; 
for (i=0;i < round;i++) { 
R Sbox[octet][(int)L & OxFF]; 
L = (Long) RotRightO-,KhafreRotSchedule[i % 8]); 
Temp = L; 
L = R; 
R = Temp; 
if(((i + l ) % 8 ) = = 0 ) { 
L RotRight(key[keyind][0], octet); 
R RotRight(key[keyind][l], octet); 
keyind++; 
if ̂ eyind == keysize) 




work[01 = L; 
work[l] = R; 
} 
/» 
** DeKhafreQ : decrypt a 64-bit Khafre block with t 
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standard S box. 
•/ 
void DeKhafre(woric, Sbox, key, round) 
Long work[21, Sbox[4][2561. key[2][2]; 
int round; 
{ 
Long L, R, Temp; 
int i, octet; 
Long KTemp[2]; 
int keysize=2, keyind; 
L = work[01; 
R = work[l]; 
switch (round) { 
case 8: keyind = 0; 
break; 
case 16: keyind = 1; 
break; 
case 24: keyind = 0; 
break; 
case 32: keyind = 1; 
break; 
} 
octet = (round / 8); 
for (i=round-l;i >= 0;i-) { 
i f ( ( ( i+ l )%8)==0){ 
octet-; 
L RotRight(key[keyind][0], octet); 
R ^ RotRightOcey[keyind][l], octet); 
keyind-H-; 
if Oceyind == keysize) 
keyind = 0; 
} 
R = (Long) RotLeft(R,KhafreRotSchedule[i % 8]); 
L Sbox[octet][(int)R & OxFF]; 
Temp = L; 
L = R; 




work[01 = L; 









i n t i j ; 
for(i=0;i<4;i++){ 
for(j=0J<256J++){ 





End of khafre.c 
«* 
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/• 
•• Program : sbh.c 
** Single block hash using 64-bit block ci|dier symmetric algorithms ' 
•• des, feal, loki, khufii, khafre. 





•• Encryption mode 
#defmeCBC 1 /• Cipher block chaining •/ 
#defme SBH 2 /* Single block hash */ 
typedef unsigned long Long; 
/* 
Function prototypes: 
** Feal encryption algorithm 
*/ 
void Feal_GetKeyScheduleO, EnFealQ, DeFealQ, 
/• Des encryption standard algorithm 
*/ 
EnDes(), DeDesQ, Des_GetKeyScheduleO, 
/• Loki encryption standard algorithm 
*/ 
EnLokiO, DeLokiQ, Loki_GetKeyScheduleO, 
/• Khuili encryption algorithm 
*/ 
InitialSboxScheduleO, SboxScheduleQ, EnKhufuQ, DeKhufuQ, 
/* Khafre encryption algorithm 
*l 
KhafreSboxScheduleO, EnKhafreQ, DeKhafreQ, 
/* 
** General hashing routines 
*/ 
PrintWordO, PrintFormatO, Do_CBC_hashO, Do_SBH_hash(); 
/» 
•• Global variables: 
** Initial vector, command name, 
** and default values 
*/ 
Long Digest[2] = {(Long)0, (Long)0}; 
Long Mesg[2] = {(Long)0, (Long)0>; 
char *hashtype = "des"; 
int mode = SBH; 
int round = 8; 
char •Instrin© 
int sflag=0; 








extern char 'optarg 
char filename[160]; 
char tkey[20J,»key=tkey; 
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char 'Format; 
/• 
•• Option processing 
Fflag=aflag=rilag=f!lag=mflag=kflag=errflag= 0; 
while ((c=getopt(argc,argv,"F:f:k:rm:a:s:")) != EOF) { 
switch (c) { 
case T: fflag++; 
slrcpy(filename,optarg); 
break; 
case V: sflag-H-; 
Instring = qjtarg; 
break; 
case Tc': kflag++; 
key = optarg; 
break; 
case 'F: Fflag++; 
Format = optarg; 
break; 
case'm': mflag-H-; 
if ((strcmp(optarg,"cbc")) && (strcmp(optarg,"sbh"))) { 
^rintf(stderr,"%8: invalid hashing mode - argv[0]); 




if (!strcn^optarg,'*cbc")) mode = CBC; 
if (!strcmp(optarg,"sbh")) mode = SBH; 
} 
break; 
case 'a': aílag^-+; 
if ((!strcmp(optarg,"des")) || (!strcmp(optarg,"feal")) || 
(!strcmp(optarg,"loki")) || (!strcmp(optarg,"khufii'')) || 
(!strcmp(optarg,"khafre")) 
) { 
hashtype = optarg; 
} 
else{ 
fyrintf(std«rr,"\n%s: invalid hash algorithm\n",argv[0]); 
fprinti(stderr," (des, feal, loki, khufu, "); 




case V: if (((round = aioi(optarg)) = 0) || 







** Error checking 
*/ 
if (enflag) { 
^>rintf(stderr,"\nUsage: %s -f file | -s string argv[0]); 




key = (char •)getpass("Key: "); 
} 
else if (strlen(key) < 5) { 





if ((^i = fopen(filenamc, "r")) = NULL) { 
^^tf(stderr,"Couldnt open input file %s!\n", filename); 
exit(l); 
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} 
) 
else if (Isflag) 
fpi = stdin; 
if (mode = CBC) 
Do_CBC_hash(DigesUcey,round); 
if (mode == SBH) 
Do_SBH_hash(Digest,key,round); 
/» 
••Print out the digest 
•/ 









•• Do_CBC_hash() : Cipher block chaining hash for a file or a string with 







int i, cnt=0, done=0, count=0; 
Long work[2]; 

























Long ••Lkey = (Long ••)Tkey; 
Long StandardSBox[4][256]; 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"fear)) { 
•• feal: default key initialisation (128 bits) 
for (i=0;i < 16;i++) ekey[i] = 0; 
if (strlen(key) > 16) 
sbh.c - single block hashing algorithm A36 
»(key+ 16) = W; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i++) 
ekey[il = key[i]; 
/• 
** create key schedule for feal 
Feal_GetKeySchedule(ekey4eal_keyschedule^ound); } 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"des")) { 
** des: default key initialisation (64 bits) 
for (i=0;i < 8;i++) dkey[i] = 0; 
if (strlen(key) > 8) 
*(key + 8) = W; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i++) 
dkey[i] = key[i]; 
** create key schedule for des 
»/ 
Des_GetKeySchedule(dkey, des_keyschedule, round); 
} 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"loki")) { 
•• loki: default key initialisation (64 bits) 
for (i=0;i < 8;i-H-) lkey[i] = 0; 
if (strlen(key) > 8) 
•(key + 8) = W; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i-H-) 
lkey[i]=key[i]; 
** create key schedule for loki 
*/ 
Loki_GetKeySchedule(lkey, lokikeyschedule, round); 
} 




if (!strcmp(hashtype,"khafre")) { 
** khafre: default key initialisation (128 bits) 
»/ 
for(i=0;i< 16;i-H-) 
Tkey[i] = i+ 11; 
if (strlen(key) > 16) 
•(key+16) = W; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i++) 
Tkey[i] = key[i]; 
KhafreSboxSchedule(StandardSBox); 
} 
work[0]=workIll = 0L; 
do{ 
if (!sflag) { 
if ((cnt = fread((char •)woric, 1,8, fpi)) != 8) { 




else if (»Instring) { 
if (strlen(Instring) >= 8) { 
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stmq)y((char •)work, Instring, 8); 
Instring += 8; 
} 
else{ 
strq)y((char •)woric, Instring); 















if (!strcmp(hashtype,"fear)) { 
EnFeal(workjFeal_keyschedule^ound); 
} 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"des")) { 
EnDes(woric,des_keyschedule/ound); 
} 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"Ioki")) { 
EnLoki(work,loki_keyschedule,round); 
} 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,'ldiufli")) { 
EnKhuÂi(woii^ Sbox, round); 
> 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"khafre")) { 
EnKhafi^work, StandardSBox, Lkey,round); 
} 
Digest[0] =work[0]; 
Digest[ll = work[li; 
} A^le (!done); 
/» 













int i, cnt=0, done=0, count=0; 
Long woiic[2]; 
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diardkey[9]; 
Long des_key8chedule[32][2]; 











Long ••Lkey = (Long ••)Tkey; 
Long Stan<lardSBox[4][2S6]; 
/• 
** Initialize the digest with key value 
*! 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key);i-H-) 
if (i < 8) 
((char*)Digest)[il = key[il; 
do{ 
woik[0] = work[l] = 0U 
** Read plaintext into woik[2] 
•/ 
if (!sflag) { 
if ((cnt = fread((char *)work, 1,8, fpi)) != 8) { 




eke if (•Instring) { 
if (strlen(Instring) >= 8) { 




stFcpy((diar *)work, Instring); 






•• Keep the plaintext for later addition modulo 2 
•/ 
Mesg(0]=woik(0]; 
Mesg(l] = work[l]; 
I* 
** Qicryirt the digest with key value in work[2] 
*/ 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"feal")) { 
for(i=0;i<8;i-H-) 
ekey[i] = ((char »)work)[i]; 




if (!strcmp(hashtype,"des")) { 
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for 0=0-4 <8U++) 
Aeyfi] = ((char »̂ ivofkMi]; 
/* 
** create key sdiedule for des 
•/ 
I>es_GetKeySdiedule(<9cey, des_lceysdiedule, round); 
EiiDes(Digest,des_keysd)edule,round); } 
if (!sbai9(hasltfype,"l<̂ ")) { 
for(i=OU < 8;i++) 
Ikey{il = ((diar*)work)[i]; 
/• 
** create key schedule for loki 
L(̂ _GetKeySchedule(lkey, loki_keysdiedule, round); 
&iLoki(Digest,loki_keysdiedule,n>und); > 
if (!strcnq)(hashtype,"khufu")) { 
for(i=<i,i<8;i-H-) 
Tkey[i] = ((char •)vrork)[i]; 
InitialSboxSdiedule(Sbox); 
InitialSboxSdiedule(Sbox,InitialSbox,Tkey); 
EnKhufu(I>igest, Sbox, round); 
} 
if (!straî )(hashtype,"khafre")) { 
for 0=OU < strien(key);i-H-) 
Tkey[i] = ((char •)work)[i]; 
KhafieSboxScfaedule(StandardSBoxX 
EiiKhafre(Digest, StandardSBox, Lkey,n>und); 
} 
I* 












(unsigned charX(Word » 24) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word » 16) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word» 8) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX Word & OxFF)); 
} 
** Print out the diged with ̂  usô -aipplied frnnat 
void PrintFonnat(Foraiat4̂ gesMl&round,mode) 
cfaar*Fomiat,*alg; 
introimd.mode; 
Long «Digest; { 
sbh.c - single block hashing algorithm A40 
int i=0; 
while (i < strlen(Format)) { 





switch (Fonnat[i+l]) { 
case W: PrintWord(Digest[0]); 
PrintWord(Digest(l]); 
break; 
case 'a': iprintf(stdout,"®/o8", alg); 
break; 
case V: fprintf(stdout,"%02d", round); 
break; 
case'm': if (mode == CBC) 
fprintf(stdout,"cbc"); 
if (mode == SBH) 
fyrinti(stdout,"sbh"); 
break; 
case 'n': fprintf(stdout,"\n"); 
break; 
case Y: fprintf(stdout,'Y'); 
break; 










dbh.c - double block hashing algorithm A41 
Program : dWi.c 
Double block hash using 64-bit encryption algorithms -
des, feal, loki, khufu, khafre. 
Compile : CO -o dbh dbh.c des.o fbal.o loki.o khuili.o khafre.o 
•• Dzung Le - Oct, 92 *« 
*! 
^include <stdio.h> 
typedef unsigned long Long; 
/• 
Function prototypes: 
•• Feal encryption algorithm 
*/ 
void Feal_GetKeySchedule(), EnFeal(), DeFealQ, 
/» Des encryption standard algorithm */ 
EnDesO, DeDesQ, Des_GetKeyScheduleO, 
/* 
** Loki encryption standard algorithm 
*/ 
EnLokiO, DeLokiO, Loki_GetKeyScheduleO, 
/* 
** Khufli encryption algorithm 
»/ 
InitialSboxScheduleO, SboxScheduleQ, EnKhufiiO, DeKhuiuO, 
/* 
** Khafre encryption algorithm 
*/ 
KhafreSboxScheduleO, EnKhafreQ, DeKhafreQ, 
/• General hashing routines */ 
UpdateO,PrintWordO, PrintFormatO, Do_DBH_HashO; 
/* 
** Global variables: 
Initial vector, command name, 
and default i i ^ t , output file pointers 
• / 
Long Digest![21 = {(Long)0, (Long)0}; 
Long Digest2[2] = {(Long)0, (Long)0>; 
char *hashtype = "des"; 
char *Instrin^, 
int sflag=0; 







extern diar *optar^ 
char filename[160]; 
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while ((c=getopt(argc,argv,"F:f:k:r:a:s:")) != EOF) { 
switch (c) { 
case 'f : fflag++; 
strcpy(filename,optarg); 
break; 
case V: sflag++; 
Instring = optarg; 
break; 
case V: kflag++; 
key = optarg; 
break; 
case 'F: Fflag++; 
Format = optarg; 
break; 
case 'a': aflag-t-+; 
if ((!strcmp(optarg,"des")) || (!strcmp(optarg,"fear)) || 
(!strcmp(optarg,"loki")) || (!strcmp(optarg,"khufii")) || 
(!strcmp(optarg,'Tchafre")) 
) { 
hashtype = optarg; 
} 
else{ 
fprintf(stderr,"\n%s: invalid hash algorithm\n",argv[0]); 
fi)rintf(stderr," (des, feal, loki, khufu, "); 




case V: if (((round = atoi(optarg)) = 0) || 







** Error checking 
*/ 
if (enflag) { 
fyrintf(stderr,"\nUsage: %s -f file | -s string argv[0]); 
fprintf(stderr,"[ -k key -m mode -r round -a algorithm -F Format ]\n\n"); 
exit(l); 
> 
if (!kflag) { 
key = (char •)getpass("Key: "); 
} 
else if (strlen(key) < 5) { 





if ((fpi = fopen(filename, V ) ) = NULL) { 




else fpi = stdin; 
/* 




** Print out the final digest (128 bits) without format 
*/ 
if (!Fflag) { 
PrintWord(Digestl [0]); PrintWord(Digestl [1]); 
PrintWord(Digest2[01);PrintWord(Digest2[l]); 
fi)rintf(stdout,"\n"); } else{ 
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** Print out the digests with the user-supplied format 
•/ 




•• I>o_DBH_Hash(): Double block hashing for a file or a string with a mode, 
** key schedule, and a number of rounds. 
•/ 






int i, done=0, cntl=0, cnt2=0; 
LongMl[21,M2[2]; 
/ • 
•• Initialise the digests with key value 
*/ 
if (strlen(key) > 16) key[16] = ^0•; 
for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
if (key) ((char •)Digestl)[i] = *key++; 
for (i=0;i < 8;i++) 
if (key) ((char *)Digest2)[i] = *key-H-; 
M1[0] = Ml[ l ] = M2[0] = M2[l] = (Long)0; 
do{ 
keyl[0]=keyl[l] = 0L; 
key2[0]=key2[l] = 0L; 
if (isflag) { 
if ((cntl = fread((char •)keyl, 1, 8, fpi)) != 8) done++; 
if (¡done) 
if ((cnt2 = fread((char •)key2,1,8, ipi)) != 8) done++; 
} else if (*Instring) { 
if (strlen(Instring) >= 8) { 
stmcpy((char *)keyl, Instring, 8); 
Instring += 8; 
> 
else{ 
strcpy((char *)keyl, Instring); 
•Instring = ^0•; 
done++; 
> 
if (¡done) { 
if (strlen(Instring) >= 8) { 
stmcp><(char •)key2, Instring, 8); 
Instring += 8; 
) 
else{ 
strcpy((char •)key2, Instring); 






/* Addition modulo 2 of all plaintext block »/ 
M1[0] keyl[0]; Ml[ l ] keyl[l]; 
M1[0] key2[0]; MI[11 key2[l]; 
M2[0] += keyl[0]; Ml[ l l += keyl[ll; 
M2[01 += key2[0]; M2[l] += key2[l]; 
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** Encrypt digests with key being plaintext 
Update(keyl, key2, Digestl, Digest2, round); 
Addition modulo 2 of the cipher text with the previous plaintext 
• / 
Digestl[01 keyl[0]; Digestl[1] keyl[l]; 
Digest2[01 '^key2[0]; Digest2[l] ^ key2[l]; 
} while (¡done); 
/ • 
** Process two additional blocks 
*! 
Update(Ml, M2, Digestl, Digest2, round); 
} 
/» 
•• UpdateQ : Update message digests Digestl, Digest2 with keyl and key2. 
** 
*! 
void Update(keyl, key2, Digestl, Digest2, round) 
Long »keyl, «keyi, »Digesti, *Digest2; 
int round; 
{ 
Long Tl[2], T2[2], Tempi [2], Temp2[2], Temp3[2]; 
inti; 
" f e a l 
*/ 
char ekeyl [17],ekey2[17]; 
Long feal_keyschedulel [64],feal_keyschedule2[64]; 
" d e s 
chardkeyl[9],dkey2[9]; 















Long ••Lkeyl = (Long ••)Tkeyl; 
Long »•Lkey2 = (Long ••)Tkey2; 
Long StandardSBoxl [4][256],StandardSBox2[4][256]; 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"feal")) { 
** feal: default key initialisation (128 bits) 
»/ 
for (i=0;i < 16;i++) ekeyl [i] = 0; 
for (i=0;i < 16;i++) ekey2[i] = 0; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key l);i++) ekeyl [i] = keyl [i]; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key2);i++) ekey2[i] = key2[ii; 
create key schedule for feal 
Feal_GetKeySchedule(ekey 14eal_keyschedule 1 ,round); 
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Feal_GetKeySchedule(ekey2/eal_keyschedule2,round); 
} 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,''des")) { 
** des: default key initialisation (64 bits) 
for (i=0;i < 8;i-H-) dkeyl[il = 0; 
for (i=0;i < 8;i++) dkey2[i] = 0; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(keyl);i++) dkeyl [i] = keyl [i]; 
for (i=0;i < strlen^e)a);i++) d k ^ i i ] = key2[i]; 
/• 
** create key schedule for des 
*/ 
Des_GetKeySchedule(dkeyl, deskeyschedulel, round); 
Des_GetKeySchedule(dkey2, des_keyschedule2, round); 
} 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"loki")) { 
** loki: default key initialisation (64 bits) 
for (i=0;i < 8;i++) lkeyl[i] = 0; 
for (i=0;i < 8;i++) lkey2[i] = 0; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(keyl);i-H-) lkeyl[i] = keyl[i]; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(key2);i++) lkey2[i] = key2[i]; 
/» 
** create key schedule for loki 
*/ 
Loki_GetKeySchedule(lkeyl, loki_keyschedulel, round); 
Loki_GetKeySchedule(lk^, loki_keyschedule2, round); 
) 






if (!strcmp(hashtype,'1chafre")) { 
** khafre: default key initialisation (128 bits) 
•/ 
for (i=0;i < 16;i++) Tkeyl [i] = i + 11; 
for (i=0;i < 16;i-H-) Tkey2[i] = i + 13; 
for (i=0;i < strlen(keyl);i-H-) Tkeyl [i] = keylii]; 




Tempi [0] = Digesti [0]; Tempi [1] = Digesti [1]; 
Temp2[0i = Digest2[0]; Temp2[lÌ = Digesti [1]; 
if(!strcmp(hashtype,"fear)) 




EnLoki(Digest 1 ,loki_keyschedule 1 ̂ ound); 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"khufli")) 
EnKhufu(Digestl, Sboxl, round); 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"khafre")); 
EnKhafre(Digestl, StandardSBoxl, Lkeyl^und); 
T1[0] = Digestl[0] Digest2[0]; Tl[l l = Digestl[l] ^ Digest2[l]; 
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Temp3[01 = Digestl[01 Digest2[0]; Temp3[l] = Digestl[l] Digest2[l]; 
if (!strcmp(hashtype,"feal'')) 






EnKhufii(Temp3, Sbox2, round); 
if(!strcmp(hashtype,"khafre")); 
EnKhaire(Temp3, StandardSBox2, Lkey2,round); 
T1[0] = Digest![0] Digest2[0]; Tl[l] = Digest! [1] ̂  Digest2[!]; 
T2[0] = Tenip3[0] Temp![0]; T2[l] = Temp3[Ì] ^ Temp![!]; 
Digest![0] = T2[0] Temp2[0]; Digest![l] = T2[!] ^Temp2[!]; 
Digest2[0] =T![0] Tempi[0]; Digest2[!] = T1[!] '^Templi!]; 
} 






(unsigned cliarX(Word » 24) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word » 16) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word » 8) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX Word & OxFF)); > 
/* ** 








wliile (i < strIen(Format)) { 





switch (Format[i+!]) { 





case 'a': fprintf(stdout,"%s", alg); 
break; 
case Y: fprintf(stdout,"%02d", round); 
break; 
case 'n': fprinti(stdout,"\n"); 
break; 
case Y: fprintf(stdout,"\t"); 
break; 
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•• Ihx)gram: Md4.c 
** Message Digest Algorithm MD4 






typedef unsigned long Lxmg; 
#defineC2 013240474631 /• square root of 2 »/ 
#defmeC3 015666365641 /• square root of 3 •/ 
/ * 
** Md4 Functions *« 
*/ 
#defme f(X,Y^) ((X&Y) | ((~X)&Z)) 
#define g(X,Y^) ((X&Y) | (X&Z) | (Y&Z)) 
#defme h(X,Y^) (X^Y^Z) 
#defme rot(X,S) (tmp=X,(tmp«S) | (tmp»(32-S))) 
#defme fi(A,B,C,D,i,s) A = rot((A + f(B,C,D) + X[i]), s) 
#defme gg(A,B,C,D,i,s) A = rot((A + g(B,C,D) + X[i] + C2),s) 
#defme hh(A,B,C,D,i,s) A = rot((A + h(B,C,D) + X[i] + C3),s) 
I* 






























extern char *optarg; 
extern int optind; 
char •Format; 
/ • 
** option initializaton 
*/ 
tflag = fflag = sflag = Fflag = errflag = 0; 
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** Process options 
•/ 
while (( c = getopt(argc,argv,"ts:f:F:")) != EOF) { 
switdi(c){ 
case Y: tflag++; 
break; 
case V: sflagf+; 
instring = optarg; 
break; 
case T: infile = optarg 
fflaef+; 
break; 










if (enflag) { 
fprint^stderr,"Usage: %s -s string |argv[0]); 
Q»rintf(stderr,"-f input_file 14 [ -F Fwmat ]\n\n"); 
exit(l); 
> 





** Get me^ge digest fixMn input file. 
*/ 
else if (fflag) { 
if ((fyi = fopeo(inffle,V)) == NULL) { 



























** GetDigestFromStringO: Get message digest from an input string ** 
void GetDigestFromString(inStrin^ 
duu-*inStrin& 
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{ 
int Len, inLen; 
char •inStr = inString; 
Long bits[2]; /• max file length (in bits) 2 powered 64 •/ 
/• 
Process 64<har blocks 
*/ 
bits[0] = bits[l] = OL; 
while ((Len = strlen(inStr)) > 0) { 
if(Len>=64) 
inLen = 64; 
else 
inLen = Len; 
/* increment the number of Len bits */ 
if ((bits[0] + (inLen « 3)) < bits[0]) 
bits[l]++; 
bits[0]+=(inLen«3); 
if (inLen = 64) { 
UpdateMd4A(inStr); 




** process the last block (less than 64 chars) 
*/ 
UpdateMd4B(inStr, inLen, bits); 




** The length is multiples of 64 chars - process the last block here. 
*/ 
if(inLen==64) 
UpdateMd4B(inStr, 0, bits); 
> 
/ • 







Long bits[2]; /* max file length (in bits) 2 powered 64 •/ 
bits[0] = bitsll] = (Long)0; 
/* 
** Process 64-char blocks fi-om input file. 
while ((Len = fi-ead(inStr, 1,64, fp)) > 0) { 
/* increment the number of Len bits */ 
if ((bits[0] + (Len « 3)) < bits[0]) 
bits[l]++; 




/» process the last block (less than 64 chars) */ 
UpdateMd4B(inStr, Len, bits); 
) 
/* 
** The length is multiples of 64 chars - process the last block here. 
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if (Len = 64) 
UpdateMd4B(inStr. 0, bits); 
} 
Md4TimeTrialO : Timing test for 10-Mb block (real time only). 








inStringfi] = i; 













Q>rintf(stdout,"Real Time - seoMids to process 10MB block: %d\n", t2-tl); 
} 
/* 








»»Process 512-bit blocks 
»/ 
for(i=0;i<16;i-H-){ 
Woiti[i] = ((inString[(i*4) + 3] « 24) | 
(inString[(i»4) + 2 1 « 1 6 ) | 
(inString[(i»4)+l]« 8)| 












unsigned char tHifI64]; 
LongWord[16]; 
intcnt,i; 
for (i = 0;i < inLenU++) bufli] = inString[i]; 
cnt = inLen; 
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** I¥ocess last block having less than 312 bits 
if (((cnt« 3) & OxlFF) <= OxlCO) { 
buflcnt] = 0x80; /• append 1 to buf •/ 
for (i=cnt+l;i < 64;i++) bufli] = 0x0; 
for(i=0;i<cnt;i-H-){ 
Word[i] = ((bufl(i»4) + 3] « 24) | 
(bufl(i*4) + 2] « 16) I 
(bufl(i«4) + 1] « 8) I 
(bufl(i*4) + 0])); 
} 







buflcnt] = 0x80; /* append 1 to buf»/ 
for (i=cnt+I;i < 64;i++) buf[i] = 0x0; 
for(i=0;i<32;i-H-){ 
Word[il = ((bufi(i«4) + 3] « 24) | 
(bufI(iM) + 2 ] « 1 6 ) | 
(buf[(i*4) + 1] « 8) I 
(bufI(iM) + 01)); 
} 
Transform(Digest,Word); 
for (i=l 5;i >= 0;i-) Word[il = OL; 
/ * 
store bit length in the last two words 
»/ 






•• Transformo : Transform to new Digest with input Word. ** 
*/ 
void Transform(Digest, Word) 
Long »Digest; 
Long »Word; 









fi(A, B, C, D, 0, fil); /» round I */ 
ff(D,A,B.C,l.fe2); 
fl[(C, D, A, B, 2, fs3); 
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ff(B, C, D. A, 3, f84); 
ff(A, B, C, D, 4, fil); 
fitD, A, B, C, 5, fs2); 
flR:C,D,A,B,6,fs3); 
fiRB, C, D, A, 7, fs4); 
ff(A, B, C, D, 8, fsl); 
ffi:D,A,B,C,9,fs2); 
fli:C, D, A, B,10, fs3); 
fi(B,C,D,A,ll,fs4); 
fi(A, B, C, D,12, fsl); 
flfiD, A, B, C,13, fs2); 
fitC, D, A, B,14, fsS); 
flf(B, C, D, A,15, fs4); 
^define gsl 3 
#definegs2 S 
#defmegs3 9 
#define gs4 13 




gg(A, B.C,D,l ,gsl) ; 
gg(D,A,B.C,5,gs2); 
gg(C, D, A, B, 9, gs3); 
gg(B, C, D, A,13, gs4); 
gg(A,B,C.D,2,gsl); 
gg(D, A, B, C, 6, gs2); 
gg(C, D, A, B,10, gs3); 









hh(A, B, C, D, 0, hsl); /* round 3 •/ 
hh(D, A, B, C, 8. hs2); 
hh(C, D, A, B, 4, hs3); 
hh(B, C, D, A,12, hs4); 




hh(A, B, C, D, 1, hsl); 
hh(D, A, B, C, 9, hs2); 
hh(C, D, A, B, 5, hs3); 
hh(B, C, D. A,13, hs4); 
hh(A, B, C,D,3,hsl); 
hh(D,A,B, C,ll,hs2); 
hh(C, D, A, B, 7, hs3); 
hh(B, C, D, A,15, hs4); 
} 
Digest[0] += A; Digest[l] += B; Digest[2] += C; Digest[3] += D; 
} 
/* 




Long »Digest; { 
int i=0; 
while (i < strlen(Format)) { 
if (•(Format + i) !='%') { 
¿rintf|;stdout,"%c", «(Format + i)); 
i++; 
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} 
el8e{ 
switch (*(Fomiat + i + 1)) { 





case 'a': Q)rintf(stdout,"md4''); 
break; 
case W: fprintf(stdout,"\n"); 
break; 
case t': fprintf(stdout,"\t"); 
break; 
case •%': fprintf(stdout,"%%"); 
break; 
} 












(unsigned charX(Word » 24) & OxITO, 
(unsigned charX(Word » 16) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word » 8) & OxFF), 
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Program: Md4x.c 
Message Digest Algorithm MD4 (extended version - 128-bit digest) 
• • Compile: cc -o md4x md4x.c 








Md4 Functions «« 
#defme fpC,YZ) ((X&Y) | ((~X)&Z)) 
#defme g(X,Y^) ((X&Y) | (X&Z) | (Y&Z)) 
#defme h(X,Y^) (X'̂ Y'̂ Z) 
#defme rot(3c,S) (tmp=X,(tmp«S) | (tmp»(32-S))) 
#defme fi(A,B,C,D,i,s) A = rot((A + f(B,C,D) + X[i]), s) 
#defme gg(A,B,C,D,i,s) A = rot((A + g(B,C,D) + X[i] + C2),s) 
#defme hh(A,B,C,D,i,s) A = rot((A + h(B,C,D) + X[i] + C3),s) 










Long Digestl[4] = {10, II, 12,13}; 



















main() : main routine. «« */ 
main(argc,argv) 
int argc; 
char ••argv; { 
int c,tflag,fflag,sflag,Fflag,errflag 
char •infile.'instring; 
extern char *optarg; 
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extern int optind; 
char *Format; 
/» 
** option initializaton 
»/ 




while ((c = getopt(argc,argv,"ts:f:F:")) != EOF) { 
switch (c) { 
case Y: tflag-H-; 
break; 
case's': sflag-H-; 
instring = optarg; 
break; 
case 'f: infile = optarg; 
fflag-H-; 
break; 
case 'F: Format = optarg; 
Fflag++; 
break; 




•• Error checking 
»/ 
if (errflag) { 
fprintf(stderr,'TJsage: -s string | argv[0]); 









** Get message digest from input file. 
•/ 
else if (flflag) { 
if((fpi = fopen(infile,V)) = NULL) { 







*• Get message digest from input string. 
*/ 








if (!Fflag) { 
PrintWord(Digestl [0]); PrintWord(Digestl [1 ]); 
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else{ 
PrintDige8tFonnat(Format, Digestl, Dige8t2); 
} 
} 
GetDigestFromStringO : Get message digest from an input string 
»/ 
void GetDigestFromString(inString) 
char »inString; { 
int Len,inLen; 
char •inStr = inString; 
Long bils[2]; /» max file length (m bits) 2 powered 64 •/ 
Process 64^har blocks 
*/ bits[0] = bits[l]=0L; 
while ((Len = strlen(inStr)) > 0) { 
¡f(Len>= 64) 
inLen = 64; 
else 
inLen = Len; 
/* increment the number of Len bits •/ 
if ((bits[0] + (inLen « 3)) < bits[0]) 
bits[l]++; 
bits[01 += (inLen « 3); 
if(inLen==64){ 
UpdateMd4A(inStr); 




** process the last block (less than 64 chars) 
*/ 
UpdateMd4B(inStr, inLen, bits); 




** The length is multiples of 64 chars - process the last block here. 
if (inLen == 64) 
UpdateMd4B(inStr, 0, bits); 
} 
/ • 







Long bits[2]; /* max file length (in bits) 2 powered 64 •/ 
bits[0] = bits[l] = (Long)0; 
/• 
•• Process 64-char blocks from input file, 
while ((Len = fread(inStr, 1,64, fp)) > 0) { /• increment the number of Len bits */ 
if ((bits[0] + (Len « 3)) < bils[OJ) 
bits[l]++; 
bits[0] += (Len « 3); 
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if(Len = 64) 
UpdateMd4A(inStr); 
else 
/* process the last biodc (less than 64 diara) */ 
UpdateMd4B(inStr, Len. bits); 
> 
f* 
•• The length is multiples of 64 diars - process the last block here. 
*/ 
if(Len = 64) 
UpdateMd4B(inStr, 0, bits); 
> 
•* Md4TimeTrialO: Timing test for 10-Mb block (real time only). 








inString[i] = i; 
bits[0] = (LongXlO * 1024 • 1024); 
bits[l] = OL; 
tinie(&tl); 
/* 









QMTntf(stdout,''Real Time - seconds to process 10MB block: %d\n", t2-tl); 
> 
I* 








»•Process 512-bit blocks 
for(i=0;i<16;i-H-){ 
Word[i] = ((inString[(i*4) + 3] « 24) | 
(inStringI(i*4) + 2 1 « 1 6 ) | 
(inStringKi*4)+ll« 8)| 





** UpdateMd4B0: process a block having no of bits less than 312. 




Long *bits; { 
unsigned char buf|[64]; 
LongWord[16]; 
int cnt,i; 
for (i = 0;i < inLen;i-H-) bufli] = inString[i]; 
cnt = inLen; 
** Process last blodc having less than S12 bits 
if (((cnt« 3) & OxlFF) <= OxlCO) { 
buflcntj = 0x80; /» append 1 to buf •/ 
for (i=cnt+l;i < 64;i++) bufli] = 0x0; 
for(i=0;i<ait;i++){ 
Word[i] = ((buf[(i«4) + 3] « 24) | 
(bufl(iM) + 21«16)| 
(bufl(i»4) + 1] « 8) I 
(bufl(iM) + 0])); 
) 
** store bit length in the last two words 
•/ 
Word[14]=bits[0]; 
Wofd[151 = bits[l]; 
Transfom îgestl ,Digest2,WOTd); 
> 
else{ 
buftcnt] = 0x80; /* append 1 to buf*/ 
for (i=cnt+l;i < 64;i-H-) bufli] = 0x0; 
for(i=0;i<32;i-H-){ 
Word[i] = ((bufl(i*4) + 3] « 24) | 
(bufl(iM) + 2]«16)| 
(bufl(i*4)+ 1]« 8)1 
(bufI(iM) + 01)); 
} 
Transfonn(Digestl4)igê ,Word); 
for (i=15;i >= 0;i-) Word[i] = OU 
I* 
** store bit length in the last two words 
•/ 






** Transformo: Transform to new Digest with input Word (3 rounds) «* 
*/ 
void Transform(Digestl, Digest2, Word) 
Long *Digestl, •Digest2; 
Long*Word; { 
LongTonp; 
/• Round 1 





** The contents of two A registers are interchanged 
•/ 







The contents of two A registers are interchanged 
*/ 







** The contents of two A registers are interchanged Temp = Digesti [0]; Digesti [0] = Digest2[0]; Digest2[0] = Temp; 
Transform 1(): Transform to new Digest with input Word (round 1). 
*« 
*! 
void Transforml(Digest, Word) 
Long 'Digest; 
Long 'Word; { 
Longtmp, A = Digest[0], B = Digest[l], C = Digest[2], D = Digest[3]; 
LongX[16]; 
inti; 
for(i=0;i< 16;i++) { 







ff(C, D, A, B, 2, fs3) 
ff(B, C, D, A, 3, fs4) 
ff(A,B,C,D,4,fsl) 
fi(D,A,B,C,5,fe2) 
flf(C, D, A, B, 6, fs3) 
fi(B,C,D,A,7,fs4) 





ff(D, A, B, C,13, fs2 
fi(C,D,A,B.14,fs3 
flf(B, C, D, A,15, fs4 
} 
/* round 1 »/ 
} 
Digest[0] += A; Digest[l] += B; Digest[2] += C; Digest[3] += D; 
•• Transform2(): Transform to new Digest with input Word (round 2). 
void Transform2(Digest, Word) 
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Long 'Digest; 
Long «Word; { 
Long tmp, A - DigestlO], B = Digcst[l], C = Digest[2], D = Digest[3]; 
Long XI16]; 
int i; 
for(i=0;i< 16;i++) { 
X[i] = Wordii]; 




gg(A,B,C,D,0,gsl); /• round 2*/ 
gg(D,A,B,C,4,gs2); 
gg(C, D, A, B, 8, g53); 
gg(B,C,D,A,12.gs4); 
gg(A,B,C.D, l .gsl); 
gg(D,A,B,C, 5,gs2); 
gg(C,D,A,B.9,gs3); 








gg(B, C, D, A,15, gs4); 
} 
Digest[0] += A; Digest[l] += B; Digest[2] += C; Digest[3] += D; 
} 
/» 
•• Transform30 : Transform to new Digest with input Word (round 3). ** 
•/ 
void Transform3(Digest, Word) 
Long »Digest; 
Long 'Word; { 
Long tmp, A = Digest[0], B = Digest[l], C = Digest[2], D = Digest[3]; 
LongX[16]; 
inti; 
for(i=0;i< 16;i++) { 






hh(D, A, B, C, 8, hs2); 
hh(C, D, A, B, 4, hs3); 
hh(B,C,D,A,12,hs4); 
hh(A, B, C, D, 2, hsl); 
hh(D, A, B, C,10, hs2); 
hh(C, D, A, B, 6, hs3); 
hh(B, C, D, A,14, hs4); 
hh(A, B. C, D, 1, hsl); 
hli(D,A,B, C, 9,hs2); 
hh(C, D, A, B, 5, hs3); 
hh(B. C, D, A,13, hs4); 
hh(A, B, C, D, 3, hsl); 
hh(D,A,B,C,ll.hs2); 
hh(C, D. A, B, 7, hs3); 
hh(B, C, D,A,15, hs4); 
) 
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Long •Digestl, •Digest2; 
{ 
¡nti=0; 
while (i < strlen(Format)) { 
if (*(Format + i) != •%•) { 




switch (•(Format + i + 1)) { 
case V: PrintWord(Digestl[0]); PrintWord(Digestl[l]); 




case 'a': fprintf(stdout,"md4"); 
break; 
case "n*: fprintf(stdout,"\n"); 
break; 
case V: fprintf(stdout,"\t"); 
break; 









•• PrintWord(): print a 32-bit word in hexadecimal format ** 
• / 
void PrintWord(Word) 
Long Word; { 
^tf(stdout,"%02x%02x%02x%02x", 
(unsigned charX(Word » 24) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word » 16) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word» 8) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX Word & Ox^); 
> / • 
•• End of md4x.c 
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/ • 
Program: MdS.c 
** Message Digest Algorithm MDS 
Compile: cc -o md5 mdS.c 
Dzung Le - Oct, 92 
#include <stdio.h> 
^include <time.h> 
typedef unsigned long Long; 
/• 
** MdS functions 
*/ 
#defme F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z))) 
#defme G(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & 
#defme H(x. y, z) ((x) "^(y)^ (z)) 
#definel(x,y.z)((y)-((x)|(-^))) 
#defme ROTATE_LEFT(x, n) (((x) « (n)) | ((x) » (32-(n)))); 
#defme fi(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) \ 
{(a) += F ((b). (c), (d)) + (X) + (LongXac); \ 
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); (a) += (b); \ 
> 
//define gg(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) \ 
{ (a) += G ((b). (c). (d)) + (X) + (LongXac); \ 
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \ 
(a)+=(b);\ 
} 
#defme hh(a, b, c. d. x. s. ac) \ 
{(a) += H((b), (c). (d)) + (X) + (LongXac); \ 
(a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \ 
(a)+=(b);\ 
> 
#define ii(a, b, c, d, x. s, ac) \ 
{(a) += I ((b). (c). (d)) + (x) + (LongXac); \ 




** Initial digest values 
*/ 
#defmeIO 0x67452301 
#define II 0xefcdab89 
#defme 12 0x98badcfe 
#define 13 0x10325476 

















** Main routine. 







extern char *optarg; 
extern int optind; 
/• 
initialisaton 




while (( c = getopt(argc,argv,"ts:f:F:")) != EOF) { 
switch (c) { 
case f : tflag-H-; 
break; 
case 'f: infile = optarg; 
flflag++; 
break; 
case 'F: Format = optarg; 
Fflag++; 
break; 
case's': instring = optarg; 
sflag++; 
break; 






if (errflag) { 
^rintf(stderr,"Usage: %s -s string |argv[0]) ; 








** Get message disgest firom input file. 
»/ 
else if (fflag) { 
if ((fpi = fopen(infile,V)) == NULL) { 







•• Get message digest fi-om input string 
else if (sflag) 
GetDigestFromString(instring); 
/• 
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GetDigestPromStringO: Get message digest from an input string. 
void GetDigestFromString(mString) 
char •inString { 
int Len, inLen; 
char *inStr = inString; 
Long bits[2]; /• max file length (in bits) 2 powered 64 •/ 
bits[0]=bits[l] = 0L; 
/* Process 64-char blocks 
• / 
while ((Len = strlen(inStr)) > 0) { 
¡f(Len>=64) 
inLen = 64; 
else 
inLen = Len; 
/• increment the number of Len bits */ 
if ((bits[0] + (inLen « 3)) < bits[0]) 
bits[l]++; 
bits[0] += (inLen « 3); 
if (inLen = 64) { 
UpdateMd5A(inStr); 




** process the last block (less than 64 chars) 
UpdateMd5B(inStr, inLen, bits); 




The length is multiples of 64 chars - process the last block here. 
»/ 
if(inLen==64) 
UpdateMd5B(inStr, 0, bits); 
} 
/» 








bits[0]=bits[l] = 0L; 
/* 
** Process 64-char blocks from input file, 
while ((Len = fread(inStr, 1,64, fp)) > 0) { 
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/* increment the number of Len bits 
if ((bitslOJ + (Len « 3)) < bits[0]) 
bits[l]-H-; 
bits[0]+=(Len«3); 








** The length is multiples of 64 diars - process the last blodc here. 
•/ 
if(Len = 64) 
UpdateMd5B(inStr, 0, bits); 
} 
/* 
Md5TimeTrialO: Timing test for 10-Mb block (real time only). 







inString[i] = i; 
bits[0] = (LongXlO • 1024 » 1024); 
bits[l] = 0L; 
time(&tl); 
I* 








^>rintf(stdout,"Real Time - secoids to process 10MB block: %d\n", t2-tl); 
) 








Process 512-bit blocks 
for(i=0;i<16;i-H-){ 
Word[i] = ((inStringI(i»4) + 3] « 24) | 
(inStringI(i*4) + 2 ] « 1 6 ) | 
(inStringl(i*4)+l]« 8)1 
(inString[(iM) + 01)); 
} 










unsigned char bufI64]; 
LongWord[16]; 
intcnt,i; 
for (i = 0;i < inLen;i-H-) bufli] = inStringli]; 
cnt = inLai; 
** Process last blodc having less than S12 bits 
if ( ( ( c n t « 3) & OxlFF) <= OxlCO) { 
buflcnt] = 0x80; /• append 1 to buf */ 
for (i=cnt+l;i < 64;i-H-) buf[i] = 0x0; 
for(i=0;i<cnt;i-H-){ 
Word[il = ((buf[(i*4) + 3] « 24) | 
(buf[(i»4) + 2 1 « 1 6 ) | 
( b u f [ ( i * 4 ) + l l « 8)1 
(bufI(iM) + 0])); 
> 
/* 
** store bit length in the last two words 
*/ 
Word[14] = bits[0]; 




buflcnt] = 0x80; Í* append 1 to buf*/ 
for (i=cnt+l;i < 64;i-H-) bufli] = 0x0; 
for(i=0;i<32;i-H-){ 
Wordp] = ((buf[(i*4) + 3] « 24) | 
(bufl(i*4) + 2 1 « 1 6 ) | 
( b u f l ( i * 4 ) + l ] « 8)1 
(bufl(i»4) + 0])); 
} 
Transforni(Digest,Word); 
for (i=15;i >= 0;i-) Word[i] = OL; 
/• 
** store bit length in the last two words 
•/ 
Word[14] = bits[01; 





• • Transformo • Transform to new Digest with input Word. 
void TransfonnCDigest. Word) 
Loiig*Digest; 
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Long 'Word; 
{ 
Long a = Digest[01, b = Digest[ll, c = Digestpj, d = Digestpj; 
#defmesll7 
#define sl2 12 
#definesl3 17 
#defmesl4 22 
flF(a, b, c, d, Word[ 0], si 1,3614090360); 
flF(d, a, b, c, Word[ 1], sl2,3905402710); 
fif(c,d,a,b,Word[2],sl3, 606105819); 
fif (b, c, d, a, Word[ 3], sl4,3250441966); 
flf (a, b, c, d, Word[ 4], si 1,4118548399); 
ff (d, a, b, c, Word[ 5], sl2,1200080426); 
fif(c, d, a, b, Word[ 6], sl3,2821735955); 
flf(b, c, d, a, Word[ 7], sl4,4249261313); 
fif (a, b, c, d, Word[ 8], si 1, 1770035416); 
flf (d, a, b, c, Word[ 9], sl2,2336552879); 
flf(c, d, a, b, Word[10], sl3,4294925233); 
flf (b, c, d, a, Word[l 1], sl4,2304563134); 
flf (a, b, c, d, Word[12], si 1, 1804603682); 
flf(d, a, b, c, Word[13], sl2,4254626195); 
flf(c, d, a, b, Word[14], sl3,2792965006); 
flf(b, c, d, a, Word[15], sl4, 1236535329); 
#defines21 5 
#define s22 9 
#defines23 14 
#defines24 20 
gg (a, b, c, d, Word[ 1], s21,4129170786); /• 17 •/ 
gg (d, a, b, c, Word[ 6], s22,3225465664); /• 18 V 
gg (c, d, a, b, Word[l 1], s23, 643717713); /* 19 •/ 
gg (b, c, d, a, Word[ 0], s24,3921069994); /• 20 •/ 
gg (a, b, c, d, Word[ 5], s21,3593408605); /* 21 */ 
gg (d, a, b, c, Word[10], s22, 38016083); /• 22 •/ 
gg (c, d, a, b, Word[15], s23,3634488961); /* 23 *! 
gg (b, c, d, a, Word[ 4], s24,3889429448); /• 24 »/ 
gg (a, b, c, d, Word[ 9], s21, 568446438); /• 25 V 
gg (d, a, b, c, Word[14], s22,3275163606); /• 26 *! 
gg (c, d, a, b, Word[ 3], s23,4107603335); /• 27 •/ 
gg (b, c, d, a, Word[ 8], s24,1163531501); /• 28 */ 
gg(a, b, c, d, Word[13], s21,2850285829); /• 29 »/ 
gg (d, a, b, c, Word[ 2], s22,4243563512); /» 30 •/ 
gg (c, d, a, b, Word[ 7], s23,1735328473); /• 31 •/ 
gg(b, c, d, a, Word[12], s24,2368359562); I* 32 */ 
#defineS314 
#defineS32 11 
#defme S33 16 
#define 834 23 
hh (a, b, c, d, Word[ 5], 831,4294588738); /• 33 •/ 
hh (d, a, b, c, Word[ 8], S32,2272392833); /* 34 »/ 
hh (c, d, a, b, Word[l 1], 833,1839030562); /* 35 •/ 
hh (b, c, d, a, Word[14], S34,4259657740); I* 36 *! 
hh (a, b, c, d, Word[ 1], 831,2763975236); /• 37 *! 
hh (d, a, b, c, Word[ 4], 832, 1272893353); I* 38 *! 
hh (c, d, a, b, Word[ 7], 833,4139469664); /» 39 •/ 
hh (b, c, d, a, Word[10], 834,3200236656); /• 40 *! 
hh (a, b, c, d, Word[13], 831, 681279174); /• 41 •/ 
hh (d, a, b, c, Word[ 0], 832,3936430074); /• 42 •/ 
hh (c, d, a, b, Word[ 3], 833,3572445317); /• 43 •/ 
hh (b, c, d, a, Word[ 6], 834, 76029189); /* 44 •/ 
hh (a, b, c, d, Word[ 9], 831,3654602809); /• 45 »/ 
hh (d, a, b, c, Word[12], 832,3873151461); /• 46 •/ 
hh (c, d, a, b, WordI15], 833, 530742520); /• 47 •/ 
hh (b, c, d, a, Word[ 2], 834,3299628645); /* 48 •/ 
#defmes416 
#define s42 10 
#defines43 15 
^define s44 21 
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ii (a, b, c, d, Word[ 0], s41,4096336452); /• 49 •/ 
ii (d, a, b, c, Word[ 7], s42, 1126891415); /• 50 •/ 
ii (c, d, a, b, Word[14], s43,2878612391); /• 51 •/ 
ii (b, c, d, a, Word[ 5], s44,4237533241); /• 52 •/ 
ii (a, b, c, d, Word[121, s41,1700485571); /• 53 •/ 
ii (d, a, b, c, Word[ 3], s42,2399980690); /• 54 *! 
ii (c, d, a, b, Word[10], s43,4293915773); /• 55 »/ 
ii (b, c, d, a, Word[ 1], s44,2240044497); /» 56 *! 
ii (a, b, c, d, Word[ 8], s41,1873313359); /• 57 •/ 
ii (d, a, b, c, Word[15], s42, 4264355552); /» 58 •/ 
ii (c. d, a, b, Word[ 6], s43,2734768916); /• 59 »/ 
ii (b, c, d, a, Word[13], s44, 1309151649); /• 60 •/ 
ii (a, b, c, d, Word( 4], s41,4149444226); /• 61 •/ 
ii (d, a, b, c, Word[l 1], s42,3173756917); /• 62 •/ 
ii (c, d, a, b, Word[ 2], s43, 718787259); /* 63 »/ 
ii (b, c, d, a, Word[ 9], s44,3951481745); /• 64 •/ 
Digest[0] += a; Digest[ll += b; Digest[2] += c; Digest[3] += d; 
) 
* * 







while (i < strlen(Format)) { 
if(*(Fonnat + i) !=•%•){ 




switch (•(Format + i + 1)) { 





case 'a': §)rintf(stdout,"md4"); 
break; 
case 'n': fprintf(stdout,"\n"); 
break; 
case Y: fprintf(stdout,"\t"); 
break; 









*• PrintWord() : print a 32-bit word in hexadecimal format *« 
• / 
void PrintWord(Word) 
Long Word; { 
fprintf(stdout,"%02x%02x%02x%02x", 
(unsigned charX(Word » 24) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word » 16) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word » 8) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX Word & OxFF)); 
} / • 
•• End of md5.c 
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/» 
** Include File: havalh 
** One-way hashing algorithm with variable length output - HAVAL 
••DzungLe-Oct,92 
typedef unsigned long Long; 
/» 
** Right rotation of a word X by s bits 
#define ROT_R(X,s) (((X) » (s)) | ((X) « (32-(s)))) 
Haval Boolean Functions 
»/ 
#defme Fl(x6,x5,x4,x3,x2,xl,x0) \ 
(((x5) & (xO)) - ((x2) & (xl)) - ((x3) & (xl)) - ((x6) & (x4)) - (x2)) 
#define F2(x6,x5,x4,x3,x2,xl,x0) \ 
(((x6) & (x2) & (xO)) ((x6) & (x5) & (x3)) \ 
((x3) & (xO)) ((x2) & (xl)) ((x5) & (x2)) \ 
((x6) & (x2)) - ((x5) & (x3)) ^ ((x6) & (x4)) - (xl)) 
#defme F3(x6,x5,x4,x3,x2,xl,x0) \ 
(((x6) & (x3) & (x2)) ^ ((x6) & (xO)) ((x2) & (xl)) \ 
((x4) & (x3)) - ((x6) & (x5)) ^ (x5)) 
#define F4(x6,x5,x4,x3,x2,xl,x0) \ 
(((x6) & (x5) & (xO)) ̂  ((x6) & (x3) & (xl)) ^ ((x5) & (x4) & (x3)) ^ \ 
((x3) & (xO)) - ((x5) & (xO)) - ((x6) & (xO)) - ((x5) & (xl)) - \ 
((x6) & (xl)) ^ ((x4) & (x2)) ^ ((x6) & (x4)) ((x6) & (x5)) - (x2)) 
/* 
•• First 256 bits of the fraction of Pi 
*/ 





** Next 1024 bits of the fraction of Pi 
*/ 
LongK2[32] = { 










»» Next 1024 bits of the fraction of Pi 
*/ 
Lx)ngK3[32] = { 
0x6C24CF5C,0xAFD6BA33,0x9B87931E,0xCE5C3E16, 
0x741831FC,0x2BA9C55D,0x636FBC2A,0xB3EE1411, 








Next 1024 bits of the fraction of Pi 
*/ 
LongK4[32] = { 
0xl37A3BE4,0x6EEF0B6C,0xAB5133A3,0x960FA728, 










•• Word Processing Orders for Boolean functions H2, H3, H4 
»/ 
int WPH2[32] = { 
5,14,26,18,11,28, 7,16, 0,23,20,22, 1,10, 4, 8, 
30, 3,21, 9,17,24,29, 6,19,12,15,13, 2,25,31,27 
}; 
intWPH3[32] = { 
19, 9, 4,20,28,17, 8,22,29,14,25,12,24,30,16,26, 
31,15, 7, 3, 1, 0, 18,27,13, 6,21,10,23,11, 5, 2 
¡ntWPH4[321 = { 
24, 4, 0,14, 2, 7,28,23,26, 6,30,20,18,25,19, 3, 




** Global variables 
*/ 
int vet = 92; /* Version number */ 
int noPass, /• No of passes to be processed */ 
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/» 
** Program: havalc 
** One-way Hashing Algorithm with Variable Length of output. 














extern char *optarff, 
extern int optind; 
char *Format; 
/ • 
** option initializaton 
*/ 
pflag = dflag = tflag = fflag = sflag = Fflag = errflag = 0; 
I* 
** Process options 
*/ 
while (( c = getopt(argc,argv,"tf:p:d:s:F:")) != EOF) { 
switch (c) { 
case 'p': pflag++; 








instring = optarg; 
break; 
case 'F: Fflag++; 
Format = optarg; 
break; 
case V: tflag++; 
break; 
case 'f: infile = optarg, 
fflag++; 
break; 






if (ipflag) { 
noPass = 2; 
} 
else if ((noPass < 2) || (noPass > 4)) { 
%Tnt^stderr,"\n%s: invalid number of passes\n", argv[0]); 
Q)rintf(stderr," (2,3, and 4 passes only).\n\n"); 
exit(l); 
> 
if (idflag) { 
digLen =256; 
> 
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else if ((digLen != 128) && (digLen != 160) && (digLen != 192) && 
(digLen != 224) && (digLen != 256)) ( 
Q)rint^stdeiT,"\n%s: invalid message digest iengthW, argv[0]); 
Qmnt^stdeir," (128,160,192,224 and 256 only).\n\n"); 
exit(l); 
} 
if (errHag) { 
fi)rinti(stdeiT,"\nUsage: %s -f input_file | -s string | -t ",argv[0]); 








** Get message disgest from input file. 
*/ 
else if (fflag) { 
if ((fpi = fopen(infile,"r")) == NULL) { 






** Get message digest from input string 
»/ 
else if (sflag) 
GetDigestFromString(instring); 
/* 





PrintDigestFormat(Fonnat, Digest, digLen, noPass); 
} 
/* 







char »inStr = inString; 
Long bits[2]; /* max file length (in bits) 2 powered 64 */ 
bits[0] = bits[l] = OL; 
/» 
»• Process 128-char blocks 
*/ 




inLen = Len; 
/* increment the number of Len bits »/ 
if ((bits[0] + (inLen « 3)) < bits[0]) 
bits[l]++; 
bits[0] += (inLen « 3); 
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if(Len== 128) { 
HavalA(mStr); 




** process the last block (less than 128 chars) 
*/ 





** The length is multiples of 128 chars - process the last block here. 
*/ 
i f ( i n L e n = 1 2 8 ) 
HavaIB(inStr, 0, bits); 
/* 













bits[0]=bits[l] = 0L; 
/* 
** Process 128-char blocks from input file. 
while ((Len = fread(inStr, 1,128, fp)) > 0) { 
/»increment the number of Len bits •/ 
if ((bits[0] + (Len « 3)) < bits[0]) 
bits[ll++; 




I* process the last block (less than 128 chars) */ 
HavalB(inStr, Len, bits); 
} 
/* 
** The length is multiples of 128 chars - process the last block here. 
*/ 
i f(Len==128) 
HavalB(inStr, 0, bits); 
/* 





HavalTimeTrialO : Timing test for 10-Mb block (real time only). 




longi , t l , t2 ; 
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unsigned diar mString[128]; 
Longbits[2]; 
for(i=0;i<128;i-H-) 
inString[i] = i; 
bits[0] = (Long) (10 • 1024 » 1024); 
bits[ll = OL; 
time(&tl); 
/* 





*» Final block 
*/ 
HavalB(inString, 0, bits); 




fyrintf(stdout,"Real Time - seconds to process 10MB block: %d\n", t2-tl); 
} 
/* 
** HavalAQ : process 1024-bit blocks. «« 
»/ 
void HavalA(inString) 




** Process 1024-bit blocks 
*/ 
for(i=0;i<32;i++){ 
B[i] = ((inString[(iM) + 3] « 24) | 
(inString[(i*4) + 2] « 16) | 
(inString[(i*4)+l]« 8)| 
(inString[(i»4) + 0])); 
} 
I* 




if (noPass > 2) UpdatePass3(Digest,B,noPass); 
if (noPass > 3) UpdatePass4(Digest,B,noPass); 
} 







unsigned char bufI128]; 
LongB[32]; 
intcnt,i; 
for (i = 0;i < inLen;i-H-) bufji] = inString[i]; 
cnt = inLen; 
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/* 
** Process last block having less than 1024 bits 
•/ 
if ( ( ( c n t « 3) & Ox3FF) <= 0x3B0) { 
/• 
** append 1, store version, pass, digest length and 
** process the block. 
•/ 
buflcnt] = 0x80; 
for (i=cnt+l;i < 128;i++) bufli] = 0x0; 
for(i==0;i<32;i++){ 
B[i] = ((buf[(i*4) + 3 ] « 2 4 ) | 
(bufl(i»4) + 2 ] « 1 6 ) | 
(bufl(i*4)+ 1 ] « 8)1 
(bufl(i»4) + 0])); 
} 
/ • 
** Store version no, pass, digest length, and message length 
•/ 
B[29] = (Long) (((ver - 91) « 13) | (noPass « 10) | (digLen)); 
B[30] = bits[0]; 
B[31] = bits[l]; 
/» 
** Update the digest message 
»/ 
UpdatePass 1 (Digest,B,noPass); 
UpdatePass2(Digest,B,noPass); 
if (noPass > 2) UpdatePass3(Digest,B,noPass); 




** only ^pend 1 and process half-filled block 
•/ 
buflcnt] = 0x80; 
for (i=cnt+l;i < 128;i++) bufli] = 0x0; 
for(i=0;i<32;i++){ 
B[i] = ((bufl(i*4) + 3 ] « 2 4 ) | 
(bufl(i*4) + 2 ] « 1 6 ) | 
(bufl(i»4) + 1] « 8) I 
(bufl(i*4) + 0])); 
} 




if (noPass > 2) UpdatePass3(Digest,B,noPass); 
if (noPass > 3) UpdatePass4(Digest,B,noPass); 
/ • 
** Store version no, pass, digest length, message length in a new block 
** and process the block. 
*/ 
for (i=3 l;i >= 0;i-) B[i] = OL; 
B[29] = (Long) (((ver - 91) « 13) | (noPass « 10) | (digLen)); 
B[30] = bits[0]; 
B[31]=bits[l]; 
/* 




if (noPass > 2) UpdatePass3(Digest,B,noPass); 
if (noPass > 3) UpdatePass4(Digest,B,noPass); 












for (i=0;i < 8;i-H-) E[i] = D[i]; 
/* 
»* Step 1: Modify the initial E 
*/ 
switch (pass) { 
case 2: for (i=0;i <= 3;i++) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i],13) 
b r e ^ 
case 3: for (i=0;i <= 2;i++) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i],13) 
break; 
case 4: for (i=0;i <= l;i++) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i],13); 
break; } 





/» Bit-wise operations with Boolean function F1 */ 
P = F1(T[6],T[5],T[4],T[3],T[2],T[1],T[0]); 
R = ROT_R(P,7) + ROT_R(T[7],ll) + W[i]; 
T[7] = T[6]; T[6] = TI5]; T[5] = T[4]; T[4] = T[3]; 
T[3] = T[21; T[2] = T[l]; T[l] = T[0]; T[0] = R; 
> 
/* 
** Step 3: word-wise integer addition modulo 2'̂ 32 
for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
D[i] = T[i] + E[i]; 
} 
/* 









for (i=0;i < 8;i-H-) E[i] = D[i]; 
/» 
** Re-arrange the word processing order 
*/ 
for(i=0;i<32;i++) 
X[0] = B[WPH2[i] ]; 
•• Step 1: Modify the initial E 
*/ 
switch (pass) { 
case 2: for (i=4;i <= 7;i-H-) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i].13); 
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break; 
case 3: for (i=3;i <= 4;i++) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i],13); 
break; 
case 4: for (i=2;i <= 3;i++) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i],13); 
break; 
> 






** Bit-wise operations with Boolean function F2 
*/ 
P = F2(T[6],T[5],T[4],T[3],T[2],T[1],T[0]); 
R = ROT_R(P,7) + ROT_R(T[7],l 1) + ROT_R(X[i],9) + K2[i]; 
T[7] = T[6]; T[6] = T[5]; T[5] = T[4]; T[4] = T[3]; 
T[3] = T[2]; T[2] = T[l]; T[l] = T[0]; T[0] = R; 
} 
/* 
** Step 3: word-wise integer addition modulo 2*̂ 32 
»/ 
for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
D[i] = T[i] + E[i]; 
> 
/ • 









for (i=0;i < 8;i++) E[i] = D[i]; 
/* Re-arrange the word processing order 
*/ 
for(i=0;i<32;i++) 
Y[0] = B[ WPH3[i]]; 
/ • 
** Step 1: Modify the initial E 
*/ 
switch (pass) { 
case 3: for (i-5;i <= 7;i++) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i],13); 
break; 
case 4: for (i=4;i <= 5;i++) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i],13); 
break; 
> 
for (i=0;i < 8;i++) T[i] = E[i]; 
/• 




** Bit-wise operations with Boolean function F3 
»/ 
P = F3(T[6],T[51,T[4],T[3],T[2],T[1],T[0]); 
R = ROT_R(P,7) + ROT_R(T[7],l 1) + ROT_R(Y[i],15) + K3[i]; 
T[7] = T[6]; T[6] = T[5]; T[5] = T[4]; T[4] = T[3]; 
T[31 = T[2]; T[2] = T[l]; T[l] = TIO]; T[0] = R; 
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} 
/* 
** Step 3: word-wise integer addition modulo 2^32 
•/ 
for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
D[i] = T[il + E[i]; 
} 
/ • 







for (i=0;i < 8;i-H-) E[i] = D[i]; 
/• 
** Re-arrange the word processing order 
*/ 
for(i=0;i<32;i++) 
Z[0] = B[ WPH4[i] ]; 
/» 
•• Step 1: Modify the initial E 
*/ 
if (pass == 4) 
for (i=6;i <= 7;i++) E[i] = ROT_R(E[i],13); 






»» Bit-wise operations with Boolean function F4 
*/ 
P = F4(T[6],T[5],T[4],T[3],T[2],T[1],T[0]); 
R = ROT_R(P,7) + ROT_R(T[7],l 1) + ROT_R(Z[i],23) + K4[i]; 
T[7] = T[6]; T[6] = T[5]; T[5] = T[4]; T[4] = T[3]; 
T[3] = T[2]; T[2] = T[l]; T[l] = T[0]; T[0] = R; 
} 
/» 
*» Step 3: word-wise integer addition modulo 2^32 
»/ 
for(i=0;i<8;i++) 
D[i] = T[i] + E[i]; 
} 
/» 






switch (Len) { 
case 128: 
D[3] += (Long) (((D[7]) & OxFFOOOOOO) | 
((D[6]) & OxFFOOOO) | 
((D[5]) &OxFFOO)| 
((D[4]) &OxFF)); 
D[2] += (Long) (((D[7] « 8) & OxFFOOOOOO) | 
( (D[61« 8) & OxFFOOOO) | 
( (D[5 ]« 8)&0xFF00)| 
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((D[41»24)&0xFF)); 
D[ll += (Long) (((D[7] « 16) & OxFFOOOOOO) | 
((D[6] « 16) & OxFFOOOO) | 
((D[5] » 16) & OxFFOO) | 
((D[41»16)&0xFF)); 
D[0] += (Long) (((D[7] « 24) & OxFFOOOOOO) | 
((D[6] » 8) & OxFFOOOO) | 
( (D[51» 8) & OxFFOO) I 
((D[4] » 8) & OxFF)); 
D[4] = D[51 = D[6] = D[7] = OL; 
break; 
case 160: 
D[4] += (Long) ((((D[7] » 25) & 0x7F) « 13) | 
(((D[6] » 19) & Ox3F) « 7) | 
( (D[5]»12)&0x7F)) ; 
DPI += (Long) ((((D[7] » 19) & 0x3F) « 13) | 
(((D[6] » 12) & 0x7F) « 6) | 
( ( D [ 5 ] » 6)&0x3F)); 
D[21 += (Long) ((((D[7] » 12) & 0x7F) « 12) | 
(((D[6] » 6) & Ox3F) « 6) | 
( ( D [ 5 ] » 0)&0x3F)); 
D[l] += (Long) ((((D[7] » 6) & 0x3F) « 13) | 
(((D[6] » 0) & Ox3F) « 6) I 
( (D[5]»25)&0x7F)) ; 
D[0] += (Long) ((((D[7] » 0) & 0x3F) « 13) | 
(((D[6] » 25) & 0x7F) « 6)| 
( (D[51» 19) & Ox3F)); 
D[5] = D[6] = D[7]=0L; 
break; 
case 192: 
D[5] += (Long) ((((D[7] » 26) & Ox3F) « 5) | 
( (D[61»21)&0xlF)) ; 
D[41 += (Long) ((((D[7] » 21) & OxlF) « 5) | 
( ( D [ 6 ] » 16) & OxlF)); 
D[3] += (Long) ((((D[7] » 16) & OxlF) « 6) | 
((D[6] » 10) & Ox3F)); 
D[2] += (Long) ((((D[7] » 10) & Ox3F) « 5) [ 
((D[6] » 5) & OxlF)); 
D[l] += (Long) ((((D[7] » 5) & OxlF) « 5) | 
( ( D [ 6 ] » 0)&0xlF)); 
D[0] += (Long) ((((D[7] » 0) & OxlF) « 6)| 
( (D[6]»26)&0x3F)); 
D[6] = D[7] = 0L; 
break; 
case 224: 
D[61 += (Long) ((D[7] » 0) & OxF); 
D[5] += (Long) ((D[7] » 4) & OxlF); 
D[4] += (Long) ((D[7] » 9) & OxF); 
D[3] += (Long) ((D[7] » 13) & OxlF); 
D[2] += (Long) ((D[7] » 18) & OxF); 
D[ll += (Long) ( (D[71» 22) & OxlF); 
D[0] += (Long) ((D[7] » 27) & OxlF); 
D[7]=0L; 
break; > } 
/* 




(unsigned charX(Word » 24) & OxFF), 
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(unsigned charXiWwd » 16) & OxFF), 
(unsigned charX(Word » 8) & OxFF), 












while (i < strlen(Format)) { 
if(»(Format + i) !=•%•){ 




switch (»(Format + i + 1)) { 
case "h': PrintDigest(Digest, digLen); 
break; 




case 'p': fprintf(stdout,"%d",noPass); 
break; 
case 'n': fprintf(stdout,"\n"); 
break; 
case t': fprintf(stdout,"\t"); 
break; 
case •%•: fprintf(stdout,"%%"); 
b r e ^ 
} 













switch (digLen) { 
case 256: PrintWord(D[7]); 
case 224: PrintWord(D[6]); 
case 192: PrintWord(D[5]); 
case 160: PrintWord(D[4]); 







»» End of havalc ** 
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